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DIALOGUE, PERSPECTIVE AND POINT OF
VIEW AS LAWYERING METHOD: A NEW
APPROACH TO EVALUATING ANTI-CRIME
MEASURES IN SUBSIDIZED HOUSING
KIMBERLY E. O'LEARY"
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, this country's subsidized housing residents
have seen incidents of violent crime increase dramatically in their
communities.' Across the country, local law enforcement and housing
authorities have joined together to develop a variety of anti-crime
measures. At the federal level, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) has assisted local efforts to combat violent crime.2
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I. For a compelling chronicle of life in a large urban housing project during the late
1980s, see ALEX KoTLowrrz, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE (1991).
2. For a discussion of federal government's analysis of the extent and nature of crime
in subsidized housing, see TERENCE DUNwORTH & AARON SAIGER, U.S. DEP'T OF
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Many of these measures have been linked to the so-called "War on
Drugs."3
Some groups and individuals have challenged several of the public
housing anti-crime measures created in the past decade.4 For the most
part, such challenges have focused on whether these programs violate the
constitutional rights of subsidized housing residents and their visitors.'
Attorneys representing clients who live in or near subsidized housing
should consider whether constitutional litigation is the best or only
method for protecting their clients' liberty and safety interests. Constitu-
tional remedies offer limited assistance to those adversely affected by
poorly conceived or unfairly implemented policies.6 To prove constitu-
tional violations, the public interest attorney must focus all efforts on
narrowly constructed elements that derive from deliberately ambiguous
doctrines. Time, money and imagination that attorneys might dedicate
JUsTICE, DRUGS AND CRIME IN PUBLIC HOUSING: A THREE-CrrY ANALYSIS (1994).
3. See Public Housing Drug Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11901-09 (Supp. IV 1992)
and corresponding HUD regulations, 24 C.F.R. §§ 961.1-961.29 (1995).
4. See, e.g., Don Terry, Chicago Project in Furor About Guns and the Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1994, at A12; see also Campbell v. Plymouth Hous. Auth., No. 94-1175NG
(D. Mass. filed Aug. 17, 1994); Brown v. Dayton Metro Hous. Auth., No. C-3-93-037
(S.D. Ohio filed Jan. 26, 1993) (alleging violations of constitutional rights to due process,
equal protection and the First Amendment right to travel, associate, and assemble); Miller
v. St. Michaels Hous. Auth., No. Y-91-2412 (D. Md. filed Aug. 26, 1991); Guy Gughotta,
Clinton Lets Police Raid Projects, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1994, at Al (summarizing
President's radio speech and warrant-less searches to protect tenant safety).
5. See Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on
Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389 (1993) (discussing how the war on drugs erodes our
fundamental liberties); John B. Mitchell, Wat Went Wrong with the Warren Court's
Conception of the Fourth Amendment?, 27 NEw ENG. L. REV. 35 (1992) (discussing the
Fourth Amendment and police activities); john a. powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage
to the Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 557 (1991) (examining a number of issues in addition to constitutional
law); Adrienne L. Meiring, Note, Walking the Constitutional Beat: Fourth Amendment
Implications of Police Use of Saturation Patrols and Roadblocks, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 497
(1993) (discussing the constitutional implications ofpolicing programs); David E.B. Smith,
Note, Clean Sweep or Witch Hunt?: Constitutional Issues in Chicago's Public Housing
Sweeps, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 505 (1993) (discussing the constitutionality of sweeps);
Jason S. Thaler, Note, Public Housing Consent Clauses: Unconstitutional Condition or
Constitutional Necessity?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777 (1995) (addressing the consti-
tutionality of sweeps).
6. See William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for
Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455 (1995) (discussing
the pitfalls experienced by groups who become too dependent upon litigation).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol49/iss1/8
1996]EVALUATING ANTI-CRIME MEASURES IN SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 135
to bringing the parties to a mutual understanding of complex needs is
spent instead on the litigation process. Regardless of whether the courts
uphold a particular policy, the results are likely to offer little help to the
clients and it often takes years of litigation.
Rather, public interest attorneys should find ways to seek, stimulate,
and assist dialogue between people and groups with different perspectives
and points of view. Attorneys should vigorously solicit dialogue and
carefully consider all relevant perspectives. If the attorneys do not
attend to this need, state actors will continue to write policies that tread
upon the rights and needs of poor citizens. Those with the power and
ability to control state policy should learn that unless state actors make
a continuous and serious effort to solicit input from a much larger group
of affected parties, their policies and programs will continue to fail to
garner the full support that they should warrant!
7. Many scholars have approved analyses which look at the law from perspectives
other than that of the dominant group. This approach is a common element in feminist
jurisprudence, critical legal studies, and critical race theory. For a discussion of the role
of perspective in legal scholarship, see Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL.
L. REV. 255 (1994) (responding to the Farber and Sherry critique of narrative as scholarly
method); Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 741 (1993) (discussing two scholarship methods); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV.
807 (1993) (critiquing narrative as a scholarly method). See also John 0. Calmore,
Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual
Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992) (providing an insightful
description of critical jurisprudential thought); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.IR-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (calling
for understanding the experiences of oppressed people as a source of understanding in
creating law).
Not all scholars who advocate looking at multiple perspectives come from critical
scholarship traditions. One scholar, describing a problem-solving approach based in
pragmatism, said:
[I]ncluding the perspectives of all groups in a society, even those whose life
experience does not cohere with officially sanctioned versions of reality, provides a
standpoint from which to critique the practices, values, institutions, beliefs, and
concepts of the dominant culture. ... [S]uch perspectives are a rich source of
positive content .... This is so because they provide affirmative counter-conceptions
of reality-they yield different contentful notions of the good, the right, and the true;
... they declare different human situations and experiences to be problematic-and,
in so doing, they generate numerous contexts of inquiry with determinate substance
that can then be addressed in the pragmatic search for resolutions.
JoEllen Lind, Liberty, Community, and the Ninth Amendment, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1259, 1305
(1993).
8. This Article accepts the premises of"dialogic" theories, which state that dialog is
a key component of the process of problem solving. Specific methods for building and
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This Article will explore an anti-crime policy that several subsidized
housing communities have implemented. Under this policy, police give
people whom they find "suspicious" notices of trespass and ban them
from subsidized housing premises. This exploration will begin by
modeling how an attorney can uncover a variety of perspectives to better
understand potential problems with a policy.9 Next, this Article will
discuss how an understanding of these perspectives can inform the
content of problem-solving dialogue. It will then analyze two constitu-
tional doctrines to determine what constitutional litigation might add to
the problem solving process. Finally, this Article will conclude with a
discussion of how lawyers might assist residents and members of
surrounding poor communities in the crime-fighting effort.
II. "THE FACTS": EXAMINING VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES
ON THE PROBLEM
A. Overview of the Criminal Trespass Policy
In the mid 1980s, HUD began to address the problems it associated
with drug-related violence.' ° Simultaneously, communities began to
design various police/housing authority programs to address the drug-
related problems. These programs included the following: increasing the
police presence on public housing sites, designing barriers to access,
encouraging community patrols, and initiating massive "sweeps. 't
maintaining such dialog vary among dialogic theorists. See generally PAULO FRIERE,
PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (The Seabury Press; trans. original Portuguese manuscript
1968) (1970); WILLIAM REHG, INSIGHT AND SOLIDARITY: A STUDY IN THE DISCOURSE
ETHICS OF JURGEN HABERMAS (1994).
9. An attorney can develop a talent for uncovering different perspectives that are
relevant to helping the client solve his or her problem. Some have criticized the
presentation of narratives in scholarship because those narratives are not scientifically
representative of like points of view. See, e.g., Farber & Sherry, supra note 7. In my
view, however, most attorneys do not have the luxury of conducting social scientific
surveys each time they assist a client or client group. In this Article, I present the stories
of some people affected by the policy I am studying. I do not present these stories as
representative of other people, but I do believe that affected peoples' experiences are
important and relevant to understanding some of the concerns raised by the policy.
10. DUNWORTH & SAIGER, supra note 2, at iii.
11. A sweep occurs when the police or the housing authority personnel enter an area
controlled by drug dealing gangs. See id. at 7-8.
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Congress passed the Public Housing Drug Elimination Act in 1988,
and amended it in 1990.2 Pursuant to the Act, local housing authori-
ties, resident management corporations, or federally assisted low income
owners received funds to reduce drug-related crime on subsidized
housing sites." Pursuant to this Act, HUD created the "Public and
Indian Housing Drug Elimination Program," in order to:
(a) Eliminate drug-related crime and the problems associated with
it in and around the premises of public and Indian housing
developments;
(b) Encourage HAs [housing authorities] and RMCs [resident
management councils] to develop a plan that includes initiatives that
can be sustained over a period of several years for addressing drug-
related crime and/or the problems associated with it in and around
the premises of public and Indian housing developments proposed
for funding under this part; and
(c) Make available Federal grants to help HAs and RMCs carry out
their plans. 4
Since passing the Act, Congress has awarded millions of dollars in funds.
In 1993, it appropriated $175,000,000 in drug elimination grants for low-
income housing to housing authorities, resident management councils,
and owners across the nation.' 5 In 1993, there were 1.4 million units of
public housing; the largest two percent of public housing authorities
owned almost half of these units.'6 These large housing projects were
the site of eighty-five percent of the violent crime that led to the creation
of anti-crime programs and they received sixty-three percent of the
federal funds allocated to those programs.' 7
Because subsidized housing laws limit access to the poorest of
American people, residents live in highly concentrated poverty. In fact,
"[t]he median income of families living in public housing is extremely
low-less than $6,500. Roughly three-quarters of all non-elderly families
12. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4301 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11901-
08 (1994)).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 11902.
14. Public Housing Drug Elimination Program, 24 C.F.I. § 961.1 (1995).
15. H.R. REP. No. 607, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 448 (1994).
16. Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where do we go From Here?, 60
U. CHI. L. Rv. 497, 500-01 (1993).
17. H.IL REP. No. 607, supra note 15, at 448.
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living in public housing have incomes below the poverty level."'"
Moreover,
Well over half of all families receive public assistance; in some
large PHAs [public housing authorities] the proportion of house-
holds on welfare exceeds ninety percent. Longitudinal data show
the dramatic concentration of poverty in public housing. In 1974,
about one percent of all households living in non-elderly public
housing developments earned less than ten percent of the area's
median income; this proportion has now swelled to twenty
percent.19
This concentrated poverty affects black households more than white
households. Most public housing residents are non-white: "roughly two-
thirds of all non-elderly families are black and nearly one-fifth are
Hispanic. Minority public housing tenants are more likely than white
tenants to earn extremely low incomes."20
In some parts of the country, police and housing authority personnel
have devised an anti-crime policy known as the "criminal trespass"
policy. Police officers, who use state criminal trespass statutes2' as a
18. Schill, supra note 16, at 517-18 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 518.
20. Id. Nearly half of the housing residents have not graduated from high school. Id.
(citing Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and
Independent Agencies Appropriations: Hearings on H.R. 5679 Before the Comm. on
Appropriations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 334-35 (1993)).
21. For example, Ohio's criminal trespass statute reads:
(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall do any of the following:
(1) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another;
(2) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another, the use of
which is lawfully restricted to certain persons, purposes, modes, or hours,
when the offender knows he is in violation of any such restriction or is
reckless in that regard;
(3) Recklessly enter or remain on the land or premises of another, as to
which notice against unauthorized access or presence is given by actual
communication to the offender, or in a manner prescribed by law, or by
posting in a manner reasonably calculated to come to the attention of
potential intruders, or by fencing or other enclosure manifestly designed to
restrict access;
(4) Being on the land or premises of another, negligently fail or refuse to
leave upon being notified to do so by the owner or occupant, or the agent or
servant of either.
(B) It is no defense to a charge under this section that the land or premises
involved was owned, controlled, or in custody of a public agency.
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device to rid public parks of "undesirable" people, suggested that the
housing authorities use these statutes to rid its sites of undesirable drug
dealers.' The housing authorities appear to have given permission to
(C) It is no defense to a charge under this section that the offender was
authorized to enter or remain on the land or premises involved, when such
authorization was secured by deception.
(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of criminal trespass, a misdemeanor
of the fourth degree.
(E) As used in this section, "land or premises" includes any land, building,
structure, or place belonging to, controlled by, or in custody of another, and any
separate enclosure or room, or portion thereof.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2911.21 (Baldwin 1994).
22. In Dayton, Ohio, a group of men who were listed and arrested pursuant to a
criminal trespass policy filed a federal lawsuit against the enforcement of that policy.
Brown v. Dayton Metro. Hous. Auth., No. C-3-93-037 (S.D. Ohio filed Jan. 26, 1993).
The court held a hearing on a request for an injunction to prohibit the use of a trespass list.
This author has a copy of the four volume transcript of that hearing. This Article will cite
to that transcript as "Brown Transcript, Vol. X, at x." This Article will refer to the Dayton
Municipal Housing Authority as "DMHA." Exhibits from the January 26 hearing will be
referred to as "Brown Plaintiff's Exhibit x" or "DMHA Exhibit x." The Brown case
provides a detailed description of the criminal trespass policy. After reviewing other state
appellate cases, other complaints, and HUD documents, it appears that the Dayton policy
is similar to policies in other cities nationwide. For a description of the genesis of the
Dayton policy, see Brown Transcript, Vol. 2, at 93.
Although there is no centralized way to learn exactly how many communities have
implemented similar policies, evidence suggests such policies exist in Florida, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Texas, Washington, and other parts of Ohio. See Daniel v. City
of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546 (1Ith Cir. 1994) (holding enforcement of trespass after warning
did not violate First or Fourteenth Amendments when applied to a leaflateer who was not
invited by a resident, following F.S.A. § 810.09); Fox v. Florida, 580 So. 2d 313 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.09(2)(b) (West 1994)); L.D.L. v.
Florida, 569 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (explaining FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 810.09(1) (West 1994)); Williams v. Nagel, 143 N.E.2d 542 (I11. 1994) (dismissing case
brought by invited guests who were banned from privately-owned, subsidized housing);
Illinois v. Russell, 604 N.E.2d 420 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (discussing defendant's prior
conviction of ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 21-3 (1991) in criminal contempt case); Miller
v. St. Michaels Hous. Auth., No. Y-91-2412 (D. Md. filed Aug. 26, 1991); Campbell v.
Plymouth Hous. Auth., No. 94-1 175NG (D. Mass. filed Oct. 5, 1994); State v. Jackson,
849 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding public housing manager can authorize
security officers to issue trespass notices but not when the person is on a public street);
Washington v. Little, 806 P.2d 749 (Wash. 1991) (using WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.52.070 (1988)); Washington v. Thompson, 848 P.2d 1317 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)
(reviewing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.080 (1988)); Washington v. Blair, 827 P.2d
356 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing SEATrLE, WA., REV. CODE § 12A.08.040); Ohio
v. Newell, 639 N.E.2d 513 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (reviewing OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2911.21 (Baldwin 1994)); City of Dayton v. Moore, No. 13369, 1993 WL 81966 (Ohio
Washington University Open Scholarship
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local police to notify certain persons that they are not permitted to come
onto housing authority property. When such persons reappear without
privilege, they can arguably be arrested pursuant to a state criminal
trespass statute.
In July, 1987, the City of Dayton, Ohio, began to compile a list of
people given a "notice of trespass" or who were "trespassed off' 23 the
property.24 The Dayton Municipal Housing Authority (DMHA) issued
these notices to persons it did not want on its property. DMHA would
record that person's name, birthdate, and Social Security number into a
computer database, and if that person reappeared on DMHA property, the
police could arrest him.25 By January, 1992, there were 2,310 individu-
als who had been trespassed off DMHA property,26 eighty-nine percent
of whom were male,27 and most, if not all, were black.28  In May,
1992 DMHA started a new list.29 By January 16, 1993, the new list
had 175 names, a fifty percent reduction in the rate of people trespassed
off DMHA property. 30 While the City of Dayton, the police, and
DMHIA indicated the new list harkened a new incarnation of the trespass
Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1993) (interpreting DAYTON, OH. REV. CODE § 133.05(A)(3) consistent
with Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.21(A)(3) (Baldwin 1994)).
23. "Trespassed off" is the phrase DMHA and the Public Defender office used to
describe this practice. Brown Transcript, Vol. I, at 97.
24. Id. at 37.
25. Because most of the people trespassed off DMHA property were male (and most
references to people trespassed off property elsewhere indicated they too were predomi-
nantly male), I will refer to these people with a male pronoun. A copy of DMHA's initial
and revised Notice of Trespass are on file with the author.
26. DMHA Exhibit "I." See Dayton Metro. Hous. Auth., Cumulative List of Trespass-
es Served, Jan. 17, 1992 [hereinafter Cumulative List].
27. I counted 249 apparently female names on the list. Certainly names I thought
were female could be male and vice-versa, but the vast majority appear to be male.
28. Brown Transcript, Vol. 1, at 10, 29 (describing those listed as "typically young
black males"). Public Defender Theresa Haire testified that she had never represented a
white client charged with a DMHA trespass. Id. at 62.
29. Id. at 16.
30. Two thousand three hundred and ten people were trespassed off DMHA property
over approximately 54 months, a rate of about 43 per month. See Cunulative List, supra
note 26. One hundred seventy-five people were subsequently trespassed off DMHA
property over approximately eight months, a rate of about 22 per month. Both the 2,310
and 175 figures are low in that both fail to account for any person trespassed off DMHA
property who succeeded in getting his or her name off the list before the print date of the
list.
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policy, many men who were trespassed off or arrested after May, 1992,
found little difference in the policy's implementation. In Dayton,
housing authority personnel, accompanied by local police who could
make arrests and provide security, initially enforced the program.
However, after DMHA began receiving federal grant money, the police
became the primary distributors of the notices, as well as making arrests.
There have been several challenges to criminal trespass policies in
federal courts alleging multiple violations of the Bill of Rights.3'
Individuals have also challenged the policies on Fourth Amendment
grounds and on the sufficiency of proof under state trespass laws.32 In
addition, civil attorneys have challenged the procedural provisions in
these policies and have raised these challenges in individual eviction
cases.
33
B. Perspectives: Subsidized Housing Residents
"[T]wo things will not change anytime soon: Life at
Robert Taylor will still be hard and dying from a stray
bullet or an overdose of poverty will still be easy-too
easy." Daisy Bradford, thirty-two year old resident of
Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, who supports the
sweeps "even though 'they make you feel like a criminal.'
She said: 'Sometimes you got to sacrifice your rights to
save your life.' ' 34
31. For cases involving such challenges, see generally supra note 4.
32. For cases involving such challenges, see generally supra note 22.
33. The University of Dayton Law Clinic has represented several clients in eviction
or eviction-related proceedings that involved visitors whose names appeared on a criminal
trespass list. Moreover, caselaw indicates that subsidized housing residents possess the
right to have visitors oftheir own choosing, thus challenging the right of either the housing
authority or law enforcement to give people trespass notices. See, e.g., Lancor v. Lebanon
Hous. Auth., 760 F.2d 361, 363 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that a requirement that a tenant
obtain permission for overnight guests was not "necessary or reasonable" nor did it
"provide for the reasonable accommodation of a tenant's guests or visitors" as required by
HUD regulations); McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 647 F.2d 332, 335 (2d Cir. 1981)
(holding that a rule which required residents to register and obtain permission for overnight
visitors impinged upon "freedom to have whomever they wanted visit their homes" where
state failed to show policy is "least restrictive in light of the interests served"). The
Lancor case made reference to the then-current federal regulations, which read that the
"lease shall provide that the tenant shall have the right to exclusive use and occupancy of
the leased premises which shall include reasonable accommodation of the tenant's guests
or visitors." Lease and Grievance Procedures, 24 C.F.R. § 966A(d) (1984).
34. Terry, supra note 4.
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We aren't all hardened criminals .... The law is not
supposed to be for just the rich .... They want to tear
up the Constitution. I guess today they going to have to
find something else to mess up.-Mrs. Ethel Washington,
one of four named plaintiffs in lawsuit against the sweeps
in Chicago.35
Subsidized housing residents cannot agree about drug elimination
policies. In Chicago, for example, 5,000 public housing residents signed
a statement in favor of warrantless searches of their apartments for
weapons.36 However, four tenants pursued a lawsuit against the
Chicago Housing Authority that resulted in a preliminary injunction
prohibiting these sweeps.37  Despite different methods for eliminating
violence, the residents revealed unity in their desire to eliminate violence
and return to a time when they and their guests could walk and live
freely without fear. The tenants who supported the criminal trespass
policy in Dayton believed that they had to choose between their own
personal liberty or police protection but that they could not have both.
Judge Wayne R. Andersen recognized the extent of the tenants' concern
in the Chicago case: "Many tenants within C.H.A. housing, ...
apparently convinced by sad experience that the larger community will
not provide normal law enforcement services to them, are prepared to
forgo their own constitutional rights."3 Residents who supported these
policies also made clear their desire for privacy: "[one resident who]
35. Id. Instead of reporting this story as one of conflict between residents, the reporter
could have chosen to report the similarities in residents' desires and needs and he could
have pointed out how inadequate the offered solutions were. For an analysis of how the
media constructs conflict, see Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story
of African/American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles, "66
S. CAL. L. RV. 1581 (1993).
36. A district court eventually decertified the class as a result of this overwhelming
resident support for the sweeps. Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 155 F.R.D. 177, 180 (N.D.
Ill. 1994). The Chicago Housing Authority paid for a professional survey of resident
attitudes about the sweeps in 1993. The report revealed disagreement among tenants about
the efficacy of the sweeps. Tenants were not asked any questions about their liberty.
Susan J. Popkin et al., Sweeping Out Drugs and Crime: Residents' Views of the Chicago
HousingAuthority's Public HousingDrug Elimination Program, 41 CRIME & DELINQUEN-
cY 73 (1995).
37. Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp 792, 797 (N.D. Ill. 1994). For an
analysis of the Pratt decision, see Erika R. George, Recent Development, The Fourth
Amendment's Forcing of Flawed Choices: Giving Content to Freedom for Residents of
Public Housing, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 577 (1995).
38. Terry, supra note 4.
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says it would be the least of her problems to sign a lease with a clause
allowing unconditional sweeps" also stated: "I want my privacy. I don't
want my rights taken away from me, don't get me wrong, but we need
somebody to come in and do this to US."' 39 Although a diligent attorney
can uncover many resident perspectives, fear of housing authority
retaliation or loss of the tenuous security undoubtedly silenced other
residents.40
Prior to initiating the criminal trespass policy, DMHA assured
residents that their friends and families would not be harassed. However
in 1991, tenants began to complain that friends and family were being
trespassed off DMHA property for no legitimate reason. The residents'
only recourse was to ask their managers to delete the names of their
friends and family from the list, however, if the manager refused,
residents had no appeal. 4' Still, a number of resident council members
supported the policy. Resident Council Vice-President Annie Pearl Gee,
a young, African-American mother living in the DMHA DeSoto Bass
project, described life before the drug elimination policies were put into
effect:
It was terrible. You could not sit outside. Your kids
could not go outside and play. The drug dealers were
standing out front your door selling drugs. You would
open your door to let them know that you see them. It
didn't bother them....
Before the policy began, police and DMHA management described to the
resident council the goal of the trespassing policy. Ms. Gee testified:
We were advised if we wanted the sites cleared to
cooperate with the police department, which I was willing
to do ... to get the drug dealers off the site that didn't
39. Morning Edition: President Pushes Plan for Gun Sweeps in Chicago (NPR radio
broadcast, Apr. 18, 1994). Another resident, who identified himself as "Dwayne," said
"he's against the sweeps... his mother's apartment was swept twice, but he says every-
body in the building knows his folks aren't dealing drugs." Id.
40. Bernard Faison, a tenant organizer whom DMHA employed to train, educate, and
organize DMHA tenants into functioning resident councils, indicated in a private interview
with the author that he believes that the residents who testified for DMHA at the Brown
preliminary injunction hearing may fear losing the progress they have made since 1987 if
they speak out against any DMHA policy.
41. Testimony of DMHA's former Associate Director of Management and Human
Services, Brown Transcript, Vol. 1, at 173-75.
42. Id. at 67.
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live there, that did not belong there, and make the site
better for our children.43
Ms. Gee believes the program has created significant improvements
in her life:
Now I can sit outside and watch my daughter play....
Before, back in '87, I could not. Now I can have friends
... come to my house in their cars or walk without being
attacked by drug dealers.... Now I feel more comfort-
able, not as comfortable as I would like to be, but I do
feel more comfortable now."
If the criminal trespass policy ended, Ms. Gee testified that she would
move:
[I]f they threw out the law, I know that I would move
immediately because ... it would be a New Jack City.
... Instead of being community-based police on DMHA
site, it would be drug based on DMHA site.45
Ms. Gee attributes positive changes to the trespass policy to the
presence of police,46 though she doesn't "think it's right to criminally
charge someone that's not conducting bad business on the site. 47
Annette Scandrick, a twenty-two year resident of Parkside and
acting treasurer of the resident council, agrees: "[M]ost of our problems
was coming from the people that did not live in Parkside."'48 Ms.
Scandrick understood the criminal trespass policy to be one that offered
safety and respect for residents:
My understanding was, it was like we was homeowners
and we had a fence around our home or our property and
we had signs on our fence stating no trespassing but your
relatives, mailmen, milknen, service people could enter.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 75.
45. Brown Transcript, Vol. 2, at 68. NEW JACK CITY is a movie made in 1991. It
depicts a poor residential neighborhood in New York City which has been taken over by
drug dealing and violence. See Joe Baltake, New Jack City: A Brutal, But Starkly Real,
Inner City Film, SACRAMENTo BEE, Mar. 8, 1991, at TK20.
46. Brown Transcript, Vol. 2, at 80.
47. Brown Transcript, Vol. 3, at 20.
48. Brown Transcript, Vol. 4, at 119.
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The no trespassing was basically for people that came in,
created a problem.49
Although Ms. Scandrick does not believe a person innocently cutting
across DMHA property should be prohibited from coming on DMHA
property again, she does believe that without the trespass policy, the
police will not promptly respond to calls or have a presence at
Parkside.5" Prior to the trespass policy, the police did not consider a
drug dealer an emergency.5'
Charles Oglesby, president of Hilltop Homes' resident council,
moved there in 1989 when "there was a lot of drug trafficking."'52 The
resident council instituted the Hilltop resident community police and
informed the residents how to report trespassers to the police.53 Mr.
Oglesby attributed much success to the criminal trespass policy-the
community based police and the new speed bumps-as part of the
solution to the drug problem.5
Some residents at another subsidized housing community are
unhappy with its criminal trespass policy. Kenya Burrell, a twenty-one
year old African-American, lives in a private subsidized housing
community in a north Dayton suburb with her two small children.55
The children's father, Gerald Kelly, helps raise their children and often
cares for them at Ms. Burrell's apartment. 6 In the spring of 1994, Mr.
Kelly received a notice of trespass,57 thus interfering with Ms. Burrell's
ability to relate to her children's father. Ms. Burrell is unhappy that
management never explained the policy to her:
I never really had a clear understanding. It's just all the
guys out here that I know ... they all got [a notice of
49. Id. at 121.
50. Id. at 128, 141.
51. Id. at 135.
52. Brown Transcript, Vol. 4, at 150-51, 153.
53. Id. at 154.
54. Id. at 156. Other residents have positive impressions of the program. Id. at 157.
55. Interview with Kenya Burrell and Gerald Kelly in Dayton, Ohio (June 10, 1994)
(on file with the author) at 1, 20 [hereinafter Burrell Interview]. At the time of this
interview, Ms. Burrell's children were both under the age of three. Id. at 20.
56. Id. at 1.
57. Id. at 1, 2.
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criminal trespass] ... almost all of the guys that have
kids out here have one. 8
The sheriff trespassed off Mr. Kelly after Ms. Burrell called the
sheriff during an argument in which Mr. Kelly struck her. 9 When the
deputy arrived, he asked Ms. Burrell if she wanted a protection order:
I asked them what was it, you know, what was it about
and they said, well, he won't be able to see you or the
kids or none of that and I told them no, don't worry about
that. But they still gave him, you know, the criminal
trespass.6
0
Ms. Burrell feels her rights as a tenant have been violated by the notice:
I feel that.., me living here, me paying my rent on time,
I should be able to have who I want over to visit me, and
at any given time he should be allowed to come over and
see his kids, whether it's two in the morning or, you
know, whatever time it may be... 6
When Ms. Burrell asked the housing manager about this policy, he
said that only drug dealers were on the list, and this would not affect Mr.
Kelly's right to visit her or watch the children.62 However, Mr. Kelly's
name is still on the list.63  In addition, Ms. Burrell doesn't think
management "worr[ies] about nor care[s] about what goes on as far as
[harassment by sheriffs] because they feel like we have no choice but to
follow.., their policies or, you know, move; that's how they feel about
it."' She angrily recalled one encounter with a sheriff's deputy:
She harasses everybody, she takes guys at random ...
I thought, you know, sheriffs had to have a reason to pull
you over,... but the sheriff that was with her that day,
he said "She can pull you over at any given time and ask
for your ID, she doesn't have to have a reason".
58. Id. at 2.
59. Burrell Interview, supra note 55, at 4.
60. Id. at 4-5.
61. Id. at 5.
62. Id. at 13.
63. Id. at 1. In 1994, the landlord sued to evict Ms. Burrell, claiming Mr. Kelly lived
in her apartment. After she obtained legal representation, the landlord dismissed the evic-
tion action and acknowledged in writing that Mr. Kelly visited frequently with his children.
Northland Village Apartments v. Burrell, No. 94-CVG-388 (Ohio Mun. Ct.) (order entered
Apr. 19, 1994).
64. Burrell Interview, supra note 55, at 14-15.
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[S]he was telling me she was going to take me to jail for
disorderly conduct because I was questioning her....65
While Ms. Burrell is pleased that the sheriff has helped clean up the
open sale of drugs and is in favor of continuing the sheriffs presence,
she feels that her rights as a tenant are being infringed.' She said:
I guess if you want to call that a good thing, that's the
only thing good that came of it, you know, that my kids
don't have to live around drug infested neighborhoods.
... I don't have a problem with the sheriffs being out
here, just as long as they leave us alone.. . . [T]hey know
who's out here selling drugs... trust me, they know.67
In 1991, the residents at St. Michaels Housing Authority (SMHA)
in St. Michaels, Maryland, joined to challenge several management
policies, including the maintenance of a criminal trespass (banning)
list." In their class action complaint, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,
racial disparity.69 Of the forty people banned from the property, at least
thirty-eight were black."' Only about sixty-four percent of the residents
living at SMHA were minorities, but approximately eighty-five percent
of the residents whose families were affected by the list were black.7
According to the plaintiffs, SMHA banned people for a variety of
reasons, including domestic violence, money owed to SMHA, a single
violent incident, or preventing someone not on the lease from living in
a unit.72 According to the plaintiffs, SMHA arbitrarily banned their
families and friends.73 The complaint chronicles a number of incidents
65. Id. at I I (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 16-17. When asked why she thought the drug problem was better, she
replied "the sheriffs." Mr. Kelly noted, "the criminal trespass policy eliminated the drug
problem." Id.
67. Id.
68. Miller v. St. Michaels Hous. Auth., No. Y-91-2412 (D. Md. filed Aug. 26, 1991).
The SMHA has about 300 residents. Id. 13. A group of"bannees"-persons banned




72. Plaintiff Tenants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at
5, Miller v. St. Michael's Hous. Auth. (No. Y-91-2412) (filed Aug. 24, 1992).
73. Plaintiff's Complaint at 15, Miller (No. Y-91-2412).
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in which families were unable to visit with one another on housing
property because of the policy.74
CONCLUSION-TENANTS' PERSPECTIVES
Although public housing tenants speak with many different
voices, 5 there are elements in common among them. These include the
following: horror at the violence that surrounds them, fear for their
children's physical and emotional well being, anger at the government's
control over their lives, frustration by the government's inability to either
protect them or allow them to be free, and respect for friends and family.
Finally, perhaps, is a skepticism by many residents that the housing
authority will protect them without interfering in their relationships with
loved ones. These common beliefs lead to different positions about
which limited options will offer the most protection of life and liberty.
C. Perspectives: Visitors and Banned Persons
[Thirteen year old] Lafeyette helped a parking lot atten-
dant wave in cars [arriving for the nearby Bulls game].
... A policeman approached and told Lafeyette and a few
of his friends, who were waiting for cars to pull into the
side streets, to go home. Lafeyette may have talked back
to him or he may have been slow in moving, but two
other boys have separately recounted what happened next.
The policeman grabbed Lafeyette by the collar of his
jacket and heaved him into a puddle of water. He then
74. Id. 41-96.
75. Residents and legal scholars have different opinions about how to best achieve
common goals, and about the problem of crime in inner-cities. Consider, for example,
Randall Kennedy's view of the relationship between race and crime. Randall Kennedy,
The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARv. L. REV.
1255 (1994). Professor Kennedy argues that emphasizing the unfairness of criminal
punishment to black defendants lessens consideration of the unfairness of crime upon the
black population. Id. at 1267. He points out that black people are more likely to be
victimized by crime than white people. Id. at 1259. Contrast this approach with that of
Richard Delgado. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White
Fears-On the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503 (1994). Professor
Delgado's emphasis is on the absence of fear of corporate "white-collar" crime which
accounts for between $300 and $500 billion in losses each year and often results in
violence to people and property. Id. at 521, 529. His analysis suggests, among other
things, that it is highly unlikely that white Americans would allow a sort of criminal
trespass policy aimed at stopping white collar criminals. Id. at 539.
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kicked Lafeyette in the rear. "What you doing here?" the
officer demanded of the boy. "Little punk, you ain't
supposed to be working here. These white people don't
have no money to give no niggers. . . ." That night
ushered in a period of confusion for Lafeyette as he
began to question his relationship with the police.-Alex
Kotlowitz16
If a person's name is on a trespass list, then that person has had
some encounter with law enforcement officers. This section gives the
perspectives of several men who have experienced these encounters.
Their stories are similar to accounts by other black men who feel that
they have been unjustly stopped by police officers.77
Mark Brown, a twenty-three-year-old African-American man living
with his family in the Dayton project, Hilltop Homes,78 is listed on the
lease as a resident. 79 Although Mr. Brown has had several encounters
with police on or near his residence as well as at other DMHA proper-
76. KoTLowrrz, supra note I, at 160-61.
77. See, e.g., David Ray Papke, The Black Panther Party's Narratives of Resistance,
18 VT. L. REV. 645 (1994) (relating accounts by the young, black men who became
leaders of the Black Panther Party in the 1960's). Eldridge Cleaver recounted in a 1968
interview:
We'd just be walking down the street and the pigs would stop us and call in to see
if we were wanted-all of which would serve to amass a file on us at headquarters.
It's a general practice in this country that a young black gets put through this
demeaning routine.
Id. at 671 (citing Nat Hentoff, Playboy Interview: Eldridge Cleaver, PLAYBOY, Dec. 1968,
at 89, 108). Papke includes other examples from leaders such as Huey Newton and
Malcolm X. Id. The case of Terry v. Ohio itself contained some discussion of the reality
of such problems. That court noted the "wholesale harassment by certain elements of the
police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain."
392 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
The court in Terry v. Ohio substantiated this perception in footnote 11, which reads, in
part, "The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
found that '[i]n many communities, field interrogations are a major source of friction
between the police and minority groups."' Id. at 14 n.l I (citations omitted).
78. Brown Transcript, Vol. 1, at 136. Although I use the present tense, all of the
information about Mark Brown, Brett Williams, and Alon Russell comes from their
testimonies in the case of Brown v. Dayton Metro. Hous. Auth. Mr. Brown's account
could also be a part of the section on residents' perspectives. I chose to relate his account
to this section because it describes encounters with the police that are similar to non-
resident persons who have been arrested under the policy.
79. Brown Transcript, Vol. 1, at 140.
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ties, he had never been arrested, charged, or convicted of any criminal
activity other than the criminal trespass itself."0
The first time the police stopped Mr. Brown, he was on his way to
the grocery store, a few blocks from the project." The second time the
police stopped Mr. Brown was in December of 1991082 Mr. Brown
testified:
I was getting ready to slip my key in the door. That's
when they [the police] came up, asked me my name. I
told them my name. They told me to come out... to the
van. I said, "For what?" That's when the man told me
not to stick my key in the door. I said, "Why?". . . [H]e
said, "Well, do you live there?" I said, "Yeah, I live
there." He said: "That don't mean you live there just
because you got a key." I said, "Well, I do live here."
My brother, Mike, was coming up. He had just came
from work. He was coming up. He asked him what was
the problem. Then they asked him did I live there. He
told them yeah. And they went on back and got in the
van and let me go. 3
The next time the police stopped Mr. Brown, he was on his way
back from the store, but not yet on DMHA property." Mr. Brown
relates:
[The police] stopped me, put me up against the van,
patted me down, went into my pockets again, asked me
did I have any weapons on me. I said no sir. They put
me in the van, rolled off, went somewhere else. That's
when they took me downtown ... to jail. 5
Although Mr. Brown spent that night in jail, the court released him and
dismissed the case the next day after his mother showed the prosecutor
the lease.86
80. Id. at 139-41, 143. Although the police charged Mr. Brown with criminal trespass,
he does not recall signing a written notice of trespass.
81. Id. at 137.
82. Id. at 138.
83. Id. at 137-38.
84. Brown Transcript, Vol. 1, at 137-38.
85. Id. at 139.
86. Id. at 140.
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Mr. Brown's mother recalled a 1988 incident in their front yard.
She related:
All of us was in the front yard, in my front yard, where
I live at. And task force drove up. And they grabbed my
son, Mark, and put him up against the van and searched
him down and went through his pockets. And they put
handcuffs on him and put him in the van. And I went up
to them and I asked them, I said, "Why do you all have
my son?" And they said, "He is trespassing." I said,
"My son is not trespassing. This is my son. He lives
here, and he is on my lease.".... [The police] told me
that Mark was on the trespass list. And I said, "Well,
how could he be on the trespass list, you know, and his
name is on my lease?" s
Mr. Brown cannot read and he had not understood he was on the
list from the 1988 encounter and, thus, had apparently made no effort to
remove his name from the list.88 In addition, Mr. Brown appeared to
have difficulty understanding the opposing attorneys' questions at the
hearing. 9 By January, 1993, DMHA removed his name from the
list.90
Brett Williams is a twenty-six-year-old, African-American man.93
His son's mother lives in a DMHA property called Parkside. 92 Mr.
Williams had been on the "old list" (pre-May, 1992), 93 and had tried to
get his name off that list, but the manager at Parkside, Ed Hines, would
not cooperate.94 Although at first he had concerns about visiting
Parkside with his name on the list, Mr. Williams continued to visit his
87. Id. at 111. Apparently, the police did not take Mr. Brown to jail.
88. Id. at 140-41.
89. During cross examination, opposing counsel asked 28 questions, in which Mr.
Brown replied that he did not understand seven times and that he did not recall five times.
He appeared to have a difficult time with the chronology. Brown Transcript, Vol. 1, at
141-46.
90. Id. at 126-27.
91. Id. at 147.
92. Id. at 148-50.
93. Id. at 157. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
94. Brown Transcript, Vol. 1, at 159. Mr. Williams tried appealing to Mr. Marker at
DMHA, "but I could never get an appointment with him. And so I just never paid any
attention. I just kept doing what I was doing." ld.
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son.95 In the summer of 1992, Mr. Hines informed Mr. Williams that
the program had been discontinued and that he removed his name from
the list.9
6
On January 19, 1993, after visiting with his son, Mr. Williams went
to a neighbor's apartment to call his girlfriend to pick him up.97 Mr.
Williams testified what happened next:
Well, when I got in the car, there was a police officer,
a patrol car right directly in front of us. ... And he
evidently turned around [and]... he put on his lights and
pulled her over.... He approached the car and asked her
for her driver's license .... I asked her to ask him why
did he pull her over, and he wouldn't tell her at first.
And he just said, "Just give me your driver's license.
Give me your driver's license." When she gave it to him,
then he asked my name. I said, "Why? I'm not driving."
So then he just asked my name. ... So I gave him my
address and social security number. He left, went back to
his car.
When he returned ... [h]e gave me her driver's
license, told me to hand it back to her, and I did. Then
he said, "And I got some papers for you to sign." I said,
"What are they?" He said, "Trespassing papers." I said,
"Why do I have to sign this?" He said, "Just sign it." So
I asked him how can he arrest me if I don't sign the
papers? He told me that he is appointed by DMHA and
he is DMHA and he runs this and he can do it, so just
sign the papers. So I sat there and I said, "Well, could
you explain to me why you are putting me on trespass-
ing?" I said, "I'm in the car. You see I'm leaving.
Why?" He said, "Just sign the paper. I'm not going to
tell you no more." He started hollering.98
Mr. Williams' girlfriend, Latina Alexander, confirmed his testimony that
the officer told him he had to sign the paper or go to jail.99 When
95. Id. In order to spend time with his son, Mr. Williams would take his son's mother
to the grocery store and the laundromat. Id.
96. Id. at 157-59.
97. Id. at 149-50.
98. Id. at 150-52.
99. Brown Transcript, Vol. 1, at 101-02.
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asked whether the officer explained why Mr. Williams would have to go
to jail if he didn't sign the paper, she replied:
He didn't-the police didn't say too much.. . . Brett was
just asking him why did he have to sign the paper. And
he was just like, "Well, I've seen you out here a couple
times." And Brett was trying to tell him that he was
coming to see his son. . . . [The officer] just said, "Either
you sign it, or you go to jail."' °
Mr. Williams did try to get his name off the list. First, he spoke with the
manager, Ed Hines, the same day he received the notice of trespass."0'
Mr. Williams reported:
I had asked him if any reason, you know, could I come
out there. I said, well, can I have visitation rights, maybe
come out here three days a week, maybe an hour or two
a day. He didn't want to do it. So I called down to
DMHA to see if I could talk to someone else who would
cooperate, and they addressed me to Mr. Arnold. 2
At the time of the hearing, his appeal to Mr. Arnold was still pend-
ing.'0
3
Alon Russell is a twenty-two-year-old African-American man who
stayed at a cousin's apartment in Parkside in 1992.' 04 The cousin's
family asked a few relatives, including Mr. Russell, to stay overnight at
her apartment while she was away in the hospital.'05 One morning, the
police, the Parkside manager, and the assistant manager came into the
apartment and woke Mr. Russell while he was asleep in bed 6 Mr.
Russell relates:
The police said-the manager at Parkside said we didn't have
permission to be in the house and that the house had been burglar-
ized and no one knew we were there so we were trespassing and we
had to leave .... I told them that the house had been burglarized.
100. Id. at 102.
101. Id. at 156.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Brown Transcript, Vol. 1, at 213-16. Mr. Russell's cousin had suffered a nervous
breakdown and was in a mental health facility. Id. at 213-16, 219-20.
105. Id. at 216. The cousin's family was concerned about the apartment being empty
because it had been burglarized recently. Id. at 217.
106. Id. at 217.
Washington University Open Scholarship
154 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 49:133
They said, "We already know that. We'll be taking care of that,
keeping an eye on the house. But no one should be here while she
[the resident] is not here." . . . [I] [t]old them that she gave me
permission to be there and gave me her key. The manager said I
had to get off DMHA because I wasn't on the lease to be in the
house.... [T]hey started writing down stuff, taking pictures of me
and my other two cousins that were there. And then they put us
out.1
0 7
The police did not ask Mr. Russell his full name. When Mr. Russell said
his name was "Alon," they wrote the trespass notice to "Alon Burton,"
assuming he had the same last name as his cousin.10 8 Mr. Russell did
not cooperate with the officers because he was mad they woke him
up. 109
After Mr. Russell's cousin returned to her apartment, Mr. Russell,
periodically went back to the apartment to care for her."0 At the end
of November, Mr. Russell relates another encounter with police:
DMHA and the police came to the house once again to
do the same thing. They said that we weren't supposed
to be there, that we had broke into the house this time,
and we didn't have the key, didn't have permission. So
the police officers didn't lock us up at that time, even
though I was there and I had been put on the trespass list
the previous time. Police officers said they weren't going
to lock us up, and they told everybody to leave."'
In an effort to remove his name from the trespass list, Mr. Russell
went to speak with the Parkside manager, Mr. Hines, however, he
referred him to Mr. Foote of DMHA." 2  Unfortunately, Mr. Foote
referred him back to Mr. Hines, telling him that "only Mr. Hines could
take my name off the trespassing list since he put me on the trespassing
list.""13 Later that day, Mr. Hines gave Mr. Russell permission to help
107. Id. at 218.
108. Id. at 223.
109. Brown Transcript, Vol. 1, at 223.
110. Id. at 219-20.
111. Id. at 220-21.
112. Id. at 221.
113. Id.
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his cousin and said he would take his name off the list.114 However,
Mr. Russell failed to tell Mr. Hines he was listed as "Alon Burton."
'
"1 5
In February, 1993, while Mr. Russell was on his cousin's porch, a
police officer pulled up. Mr. Russell recounted at the hearing:
[The officer] asked me some questions about some guy.
And he asked me did I know his name, and I told him
that I didn't know him by that name. Then when he told
me his nickname, I told him I knew him. He asked me
to get in the car, he had some questions to ask me. Then
he said that he would be back. He left and went to the
[Parkside] office.... Then he came back, and he sat in
the alley for about five minutes and backup came ...
He came over to me and told me to put my cigarette out
and get in the car. I put my cigarette out, and he
searched me. I got in the car. We rode up to the office.
He got out the car, went into the office again for about
five minutes. And he came back out, wrote something
down... and said that I had to turn around and put the
handcuffs on me, I wasn't supposed to be out there. The
manager said I wasn't supposed to be out there. And he
took me downtown... [tlo the police station... [where]
I was arrested and booked for trespass.
16
Mr. Russell stayed in jail for six to seven hours before being re-
leased." 7
Kenneth Hudson, a twenty-seven-year-old African-American man
honorably discharged from the miliary service in 1989, works at a local
hospital and has no criminal record other than the criminal trespass-
es." 8 Although Mr. Hudson does not live in DMHA housing, he grew
up in a neighborhood adjacent to a project called Edgewood Court and
often walks through that project." 9
In the summer of 1992, two police officers approached him, asked
him his name and what he was doing in the area. 20 Mr. Hudson, who
114. Brown Transcript, Vol. 1, at 222.
115. Id. at 223.
116. Id. at 213-15.
117. Id. at 215.
118. Brown Transcript, Vol. 4, at 103-04, 106.
119. Id. at 104.
120. Id. at 104-05.
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mentioned that he formerly worked for DMHA, asked the police why
they were questioning him.' Mr. Hudson recalls:
One [officer] started telling me that they were hired by
the [DMI-IA] to check people coming in and out of the
area.. .. And he started to go on in more detail .... But
I told him that there were no signs posted, nothing was
mentioned about it in the newspaper, which I read the
newspaper every day during lunch at work. I said
nothing was mentioned about it on the news, local news.
And at that point he asked me to step over to the van.
... Other officers gathered around us. And I think it was
six all together. And a big discussion-the one in the
van, the driver, got into a-I mean, he was-had an
attitude because when I had mentioned working for
Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority, his language, he
was very vulgar towards me, which he didn't even know
why the other two... officers were having.., a decent
conversation. Then it kind of started getting out of
hand."
While one officer accused Mr. Hudson of lying about working for
DMHA, the other frisked him,' which upset Mr. Hudson:
I told him he didn't have no right to put his hands on me.
And one of the officers said, 'Well, we're going to take
your picture.' I asked him why. He said, 'Because the
next time we catch you on this property again, then we
can prosecute you, arrest you for criminal trespass.' So I
said, 'Well go ahead on.' So then he took my pic-
ture. 
124
Eventually Mr. Hudson told the officers his name was "John Doe," but
this confused the police, as Mr. Hudson related:
The officer said, "Well, we have got to get his name. No
we don't need his name, we need his picture." They said,
"Well, he got to sign this form." Then one of them said,
121. Id. at 105.
122. Id.
123. Brown Transcript, Vol. 5, at 106.
124. Id.
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"No, he don't have to sign it. Just put John Doe on
it.,,125
When Mr. Hudson received his copy of the form, he left the DMHA
property but noticed a police van following him, as he later testified:
[T]hen I looked around. Two other officers was coming
up from behind me and one said, "Let me have your I.D."
the same officers that was over in Dayton Metropolitan
Housing Authority. ... Then I got into a conversation
with the two that was coming up from behind me.
Meanwhile, the ones that was in the van had got out of
the van. They had surrounded me.
[T]he driver, he had grabbed me from behind, slammed
me down on the ground. One officer was on one arm, the
other--one officer was on another arm, and another
officer had one leg, and another officer had my other leg.
Then one jumped down in my groin. And the other one,
the van driver, used a chokehold. They covered my mouth
and my nose at the same time to where I couldn't breathe.
My heart was racing. I couldn't breathe. He was like,
"You had enough, nigger? Because I can keep doing this
shit all the goddamn day." His words exactly. 26
After this frightening incident, the police booked Mr. Hudson for
trespass and took him to the hospital for a groin and shoulder injury, and
scrapes and bruises. 27 During a lengthy discussion, Mr. Hudson heard
officers discussing what they could charge him with:
[O]ne was saying that we could charge him with resisting
arrest. And another one said, "Well, if we charge him
with that, we could charge him with disorderly conduct."
Another one said, "Well, we can probably make that
jaywalking stick.' 2 8
Before booking him, an officer reached into Hudson's pocket and
took back the trespass notice:
125. Id. at 106-07.
126. Id. at 107-08.
127. Id. at 109.
128. Id. at I11.
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[T]he other one asked, "Did he sign it?" And then he
said, "No." He said, "Good, because if he had signed it,
our ass would have been out."' 29
The police charged Mr. Hudson with resisting arrest, disorderly
conduct, jaywalking and assault. 3  Since this incident, Mr. Hudson
has made a point of staying away from DMHA housing sites.'
CONCLUSION-PERSPECTIVES OF "TRESPASSERS"
The pattern of stops and, sometimes, arrests detailed by the
foregoing men paints a picture of a standardless, arbitrary and sometimes
dangerous policy under which law enforcement officers decide who is
"in" and who is "out." The criminal trespass policy, as related by these
men, appears to concern more than prevention of drug-related crime.
E. Perspectives: Law enforcement
Every law-abiding American, rich or poor, has the right
to raise children without the fear of criminals terrorizing
where they live .... There are many rights that our laws
and our Constitution guarantee to every citizen, but that
mother and her children have certain rights we are letting
slip away. They include the right to go out to the
playground and the right to sit by an open window, the
right to walk to the comer without fear of gunfire, the
right to go to school safely in the morning, and the right
to celebrate your tenth birthday without coming home to
bloodshed and terror.
-President Bill Clinton 132
[A]ny abstract analysis of people's rights, of the type the
ACLU might do, is swamped in real life by people's
rights being denied [by criminals].
-Henry G. Cisneros, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development133
129. Brown Transcript, Vol. 4, at 110.
130. Id. at 111.
131. Id. at 112.
132. President's Radio Address, PUB. PAPERS 701-02 (Apr. 16, 1994).
133. Clinton Backs No-Warrant Search Plan; Public Housing Is Target, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 17, 1994, at IA.
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This section will explore the justifications of state actors for the
criminal trespass policy by examining the experiences of those state
actors most involved with the policy: the police. In response to
complaints by the Public Defender Office concerning the criminal
trespass policies, the Dayton police formulated its official position in a
written memorandum. 34 Although there had been limited training
prior to May of 1992, the police made several major changes to the
program. Upon issuing the new notice of trespass form, officers had to
complete a narrative section. 35 In addition, each officer had to attend
a training program.
36
In the training sessions, instructors encouraged the Dayton police to
speak with the residents and visitors in housing communities in an effort
to get to know them. 37 But the police could not contact these people
for mere "casual conversation" unless there was "some form of
reasonable suspicion that attracted [the police] to [them]. 38 If an
officer has reasonable suspicion to contact an individual, he must notate
this suspicious behavior in the narrative part of the criminal trespass
form, otherwise the officer may not trespass off that individual.
39
Officers who see suspicious activity are expected to investigate and issue
a notice of trespass unless the suspected individual offers a legitimate or
credible reason for being on the premises."4
As a general rule, street level officers protect communities from
people who may do harm. Therefore, officers look for signs of trouble
134. "Operation A.C.E." in Columbus, Ohio is a similar policy. In response to
complaints about the program, the police department in Columbus drafted a manual of
Supreme Court cases it felt officers needed to understand prior to participating in what
they call "saturation" patrols. Officers must receive a score of 70% or higher before they
can participate in the program. Meiring, supra note 5, at 501. Meiring suggests that every
police department that institutes similar programs should have a detailed policy manual
explaining how the program works and what officers should do. Id. at 535.
135. Brown Transcript, Vol. 3, at 170.
136. Id. at 168. There were approximately 200 officers participating in the overtime
trespass program.
137. Id. at 172.
138. Id. at 171.
139. Id. at 170-71, 174. In addition, the officer will no longer be permitted to partici-
pate in the program.
140. Brown Transcript, Vol. 3, at 180.
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with the intention of stopping it.14' The officers' work carries with it
a constant risk of harm to the officer and other individuals. As a result,
officers maintain a certain attitude toward the public:
Police officers relish respect and, in many small ways,
insist on a show of deference from the ordinary folk
among whom they work. They know they represent force
-they are, after all, 'the Force'-and they move with an
air of confidence that tells the world to yield the right of
way as they pass by. The manner of assured, authorita-
tive presence and control is so characteristic I am
convinced it has a functional as well as an attitudinal
base. Manifest confidence begets submission, and the
cops leam the firm tone and hand that informs even the
normally aggressive customer of the futility of resistance.
It's effective.14 2
However, there is a balance between demanding such respect and
abusing this authority:
At the same time, we do not want our police to exploit
their position of dominance to gain the corrupt rewards of
office or to revel in their superiority at the expense of the
141. Professor H. Richard Uviller believes this attitude derives from an officer's need
to be skeptical to do good work. He describes eight axioms police hold to be true:
1. Criminals are often the most persuasive liars.
2. When a crime has been committed, someone did it, and the suspect is the most
likely candidate.
3. Self-serving statements, regardless of vehemence, are less likely to be true than
self-damaging statements.
4. "Respectable citizens" (e.g., local merchants, middle-aged married people,
conventionally employed people) are more likely to tell the truth than other sorts, but
even honest people rarely tell cops the whole truth.
5. Friends and family members can be expected to lie to corroborate the story of
a person in trouble.
6. Hope of monetary gain, fear of reprisal, and the settling of old scores are
powerful inducements to fabrication.
7. Stories that fit the physical facts in some respects are entitled to careful
consideration in all particulars.
8. Stories that are contradicted by the physical facts in some particular are likely
to be false in all respects.
H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 214 (1988).
142. Id. at 16.
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citizen's sense of personal dignity. The demands of
restraint must be strong enough to balance the temptations
of power; the freedom and peace of mind of the commu-
nity hangs in that precarious balance. And the cop is
stretched between broad license and severe limitation.'43
These officers, then, have a difficult job. They must become
acquainted with residents and visitors in a positive way, so they develop
a sophisticated instinct about which conditions are "normal" and which
conditions should cause alarm. At the same time, the officers must be
skeptical and vigilant. The authoritarian stance that protects them can
easily lead to an abusive encounter unless the trained professional officer
can defuse the tension inherent in many confrontational situations.
Furthermore, the police face additional problems in subsidized housing
communities. They are likely to be seen as outsiders because they do
not typically live in poverty-stricken neighborhoods. In addition, police
forces do not typically reflect the racial or ethnic composition of such
neighborhoods, particularly in the larger urban projects."
Anecdotal accounts of police misconduct are well known. One
incident, like that of Mr. Hudson, can spread quickly throughout the
community. Officer Miles Clark of the Dayton Police describes residents
as uncooperative, such as not answering their doors in response to
repeated knocks.'45 Such an attitude by residents is reflected in
national reports. 46 Residents living in economically more prosperous
neighborhoods have fewer and more positive experiences with police
143. Id.
144. In 1965, for example, the non-white population of Dayton, Ohio was 26% and
4% of police officers in Dayton were non-white. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 321 (1968). In 1990, African-Americans constituted
40% of Dayton's population with an additional 2% consisting of other non-white people.
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION,
1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: SUMMARY POPULATION AND HOUSING
CHARACTERISTICS 81 (1990). In August, 1995, Dayton police reported that 9% of Dayton
police officers were black. The author obtained the police composition from the Dayton
Police Community Relations Office. As a general rule, public housing neighborhoods
have even more highly concentrated non-white populations than the cities in which they
are situated.
145. Brown Transcript, Vol. 4, at 46.
146. See DUNwORTH & SAIGER, supra note 2, at 60 ("[T]his rough proportionality
[between arrests and crime rates in public housing] appears to occur without particularly
close cooperation between police and either public housing residents or housing
authorities.").
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officers; where officers reside there is also social interaction. Dialogue
between police and residents in such areas is logically more comfortable
and more productive than in subsidized housing neighborhoods. This
"outsider" status in public housing projects probably makes officers more
concerned for their own physical safety, and more likely to look for signs
of trouble, than they would in a less threatening environment.
Officer Larry Jones, an African-American, is a community based
Dayton police officer assigned to the Parkside project. 47 Officer Jones
was not a member of the drug "task force."'148 Part of his job, in
addition to responding to citizen complaints in the area, was to enforce
the trespass policy141 On the beat, he carried trespass notices and a
copy of the list given to him by Parkside managers. 5 ' Officer Jones
considered himself an agent of Parkside, but he had never attended the
required training program nor had he seen any written policies concern-
ing the enforcement of the list.'
Officer Jones further indicated that the criteria for issuing a notice
of criminal trespass were subjective. While he does not know the term
"Terry stop,"'52 he testified that "the notices would be issued pursuant
to any and all conduct that would appear to be illegal that would be
happening out there that I would be observing."'53  He stated that
observing illegal activity was "the only basis that I could make a
decision like that, to trespass anybody off that area." 5" However, he
suggested that he might have given a notice to someone loitering on
DMHA property if he suspected that person was involved in illegal
activity.5 5 Officer Jones' suspicion of a particluar person, however,
was based on his observation of the person at that time or on previous
147. Brown Transcript, Vol. 2, at 5.
148. Id. at 7. HUD agreed to pay the police on the task force overtime to monitor
DMHA property. Id.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id. at 9.
151. Id. at 8. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
152. Brown Transcript, Vol. 2, at 35. For a discussion of police stop standard set out
in Terry v. Ohio, see infra note 248-55 and accompanying text.
153. Brown Transcript, Vol. 2, at 9.
154. Id. at 9.
155. Id. at 10.
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occasions."' Therefore, Officer Jones may have stopped and given a
notice of trespass to individuals who had done nothing more than stand
on DMHA property if he had previously seen them do something he
suspected was criminal.
Officer Jones was the officer who issued the notice of trespass to
Mr. Williams. 157  Officer Jones knew Mr. Williams because he had
arrested him several months earlier for drug abuse outside of DMHA
property. 8  A few weeks before issuing a notice of trespass to Mr.
Williams in January, 1993, Officer Jones testified:
I have observed him for like over a two-week period.
And Mr. Williams would be out at various apartments, in
front of various apartments. There would be several areas
that he would hang out. He would just walk-him and a
few other people that he would associate out there. Cars
would be coming in from out of the area. He and a few
of his peers would be making contact with these people.
And then basically he would go into another apartment,
move around the projects. And it appeared that he was
making transactions of some sort.
When I went to try to contact him or the other individ-
uals that were involved, they would dart into various
apartments, knock on doors real quick; and anybody who
would let them in, they would dart in. And a couple of
times I even went to an apartment to try to contact him,
and he had gone out the back door. Went in the front,
went out the back door.
And he would do this evasive action on several
occasions after, what appeared to me, after he had been
making transactions with people.'59
156. Id. at 15. Sometimes Officer Jones would issue a notice several weeks after he
observed suspicious activity. Id. This could have happened because the people who were
engaged in suspicious activity (usually apparent drug transactions) often fled when
approached, thus he could not question nor give them a notice of trespass at the time.
Moreover, Officer Jones normally did not call for backup or request a warrant to search
the places where the suspicious people fled. Id. at 20.
157. Id. at 31. See supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
158. Brown Transcript, Vol. 2, at 26. Officer Jones testified that Mr. Williams had
"admitted to me at that time that he was a drug dealer." Id.
159. Id. at 36.
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Officer Jones trespassed Mr. Williams off the property because he
had been loitering "over a period of time,"' 6 and thought it was
appropriate to issue a notice to him, even though Officer Jones had no
suspicion of any criminal activity at that time.'6' Though Officer Jones
apparently knew Mr. Williams had a child at Parkside, he could not
recall whether Mr. Williams told him he was visiting his child, thinking
that "he might have even told me something,"'6 then later stating "he
did not indicate that to me at all." 63 He could not recall any other
details of the stop except that Mr. Williams, who had been "very
pleasant" months earlier, was now "very hostile."' 6  Officer Jones
stated that he did not threaten to arrest Mr. Williams if he refused to sign
the notice, nor did he pat him down. 65
Officer Jones was also the officer who arrested Alon Russell. 6
He had observed Mr. Russell around Parkside, playing basketball and not
causing any problems, but noticed Mr. Russell:
[H]anging around and doing the same sort of things, I
would see some of the other people do that I suspected
were dealing drugs, going up to cars, hanging out front
when people come by. He would go up and look like he
is making transactions. Then he would leave that particu-
lar area and then go into another area and make more
contacts with other people, and then they would drive off.
I kept observing him doing this. 16
7
Officer Jones summoned Mr. Russell to court and told him he should not
be at Parkside; Russell indicated he would appeal to remove his name
160. Id. at 18.
161. Id. at 21, 24.
162. Id. at 31.
163. Brown Transcript, Vol. 2, at 37.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 24.
166. Id. at 38-39. For a description of Alon Russell's arrest, see supra notes 104-17
and accompanying text.
167. Id. at 38-39.
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from the list. 6' Officer Jones testified: "[A] week later ... I ob-
served him again on there. And at that point I arrested him." 69
Officer Jones sometimes intervened in ways other than trespass or
arrest. He testified, for example, that
[I]f these [juveniles] have been repeatedly doing the same
sort of things that lead me to believe through my observa-
tion that they are doing something illegal, I've contacted
their parents and let them know that I think they are
doing something illegal and to let them handle them.70
The Dayton Police Department hired Officer Miles Clark on the
overtime trespass program in 1989, and by 1993 he had worked more
shifts than any other police officer.171 Officer Clark testified that he
would not stop anyone unless he had a "reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot' 7  such as "[l]oitering aimlessly, time of
day, known dopers, or other criminals that I personally know ...
[S]uspicious criminal activity would have to be present visually for me
in order to approach them in that regard."' 73 When he sees suspicious
activity, he approaches the people and asks them their names and
inquires why they are there.' 74 If they have "any sort of reasonable
explanation" about why they are there, he checks their names on the
trespass list and walks away if they are not on it."75 Although he
testified that he only issues notices of criminal trespass when he sees
"criminal activity on DMHA property," he did issue a trespass notice to
one man who was "loitering." 76 When Officer Clark issues a notice,
168. Brown Transcript, Vol. 2, at 38-39. Mr. Russell (whose name was listed as
"Alon Burton" on the list) testified that he had appealed that same day and the manager
at Parkside said he would take his name off the list.
169. Id. at 39.
170. Id. at 37-38.
171. Brown Transcript, Vol. 4, at 42-43. Unlike Officer Jones, Officer Clark has
attended training sessions on how to enforce the trespass program. Id. at 43.
172. Id. at 44.
173. Id. at 45. It is doubtful that "loitering aimlessly" can create a legitimate suspicion
of criminal activity that would justify a stop. For a discussion of the constitutionality of
loitering ordinances, see Joel N. Berg, Note, The Troubled Constitutionality of Antigang
Loitering Laws, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 461 (1993).
174. Brown Transcript, Vol. 4, at 46.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 72-75.
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he records identifying information about the person, takes a snapshot of
him, and asks him to sign the form.'77 He tells him that he is issuing
the notice, advises the person of his right to appeal, and informs him that
he must leave the property.'78 However, Officer Clark did not believe
he needed to have a suspicion of criminal activity to question a person
about whether he was on the list.'79 He might simply stop a person
walking across a lawn or someone who is loitering and ask his name; if
the person's name appears on the list, Officer Clark will arrest the
person.' While Officer Clark testified that a person can refuse to
speak with him or walk away, he ran after one man who had been
"loitering" and gave him a trespass notice.'
CONCLUSION-POLICE PERSPECTIVES
Officers Jones and Clark revealed a jumbled understanding of
criminal trespass programs, Terry stops, and Fourth Amendment law. As
United States District Court Judge James B. Zagel stated:
Street-level enforcement, in my experience as both a
prosecutor and state police director, has always depended
on the police 'tossing' a large number of cars and people
without much more than an educated hunch.'
Police are likely to see the Fourth Amendment as an impediment to the
fight against crime:
[W]e know that in this system even the conscientious cop
is often tempted to bend the facts to reach what he
believes to be the just outcome. ... But the major
temptation to perjury, I believe, is the desire to evade the
177. Id. at 49-50.
178. Id. at 50-51. Officer Clark fails to explain why he does not arrest the individual
for the criminal activity.
179. Brown Transcript, Vol. 4, at 50-51.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 84. When that man was stopped after the chase, he admitted to gambling,
a minor offense. However, Officer Clark was not aware of the gambling offense prior to
the chase.
182. James B. Zagel, Drug Rhetoric, Courts and the Law: A Response to Professor
Rudovsky, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 275, 282.
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effects of constitutional rulings that seem to nullify good,
honest police work. s3
The Dayton officers rarely considered obtaining an arrest warrant.
Police officers generally find warrants extremely difficult to obtain and,
if obtained, often too late to do any good.'84 While the officers
admitted that they could stop, inquire, and arrest persons who had
committed crimes in their presence without a trespass list, they appeared
to find the trespass list a major convenience in ridding the projects of
undesirable people. This should come as no surprise, as the trespass list
helps create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (virtually any
young, black male could be on the list) and allows police to stop,
question and "check out" anyone they find suspicious.
III. ENGAGING IN DIALOGUE
A. The Process of Dialogue
Understanding the variety of needs and experiences reflected by
residents, "trespassers," and police officers can inform public interest
attorneys about the importance of meaningful dialogue in the creation,
implementation, and evaluation of policies such as the criminal trespass
policy. While many have written about the importance of a "dialogic
process," the focus by most attorneys has centered on "rights" and
constitutional litigation.8' Because public interest attorneys have done
little to foster dialogue, they must take steps to assist the dialogue pro-
cess.
8 6
183. UVILLER, supra note 141, at 113.
184. Id. at 124. Uviller titles his Chapter by proclaiming, "If only you had a warrant
you could walk through walls."
185. Anti-poverty lawyers have focused energies on procedural remedies for many
reasons. As Rebecca Zietlow points out, low income people have fared better in formal,
rather than informal, adjudicatory settings. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don't Add
Up to Rights: The Importance of Preserving Due Process in Light of Recent Welfare
Reform Measures, 45 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 1996). While the content of
the remedies has been far from adequate, formal procedures have at least held government
officials accountable to some objective standards. I would argue, however, that it is time
government officials realized that, without actual input from affected groups, many
government programs will continue to fail to achieve their goals.
186. Whether lawyer-driven constitutional litigation strategies should dominate poverty
lawyering has been the subject of debate among anti-poverty lawyers. For a discussion
of these debates, see Martha F. Davis, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age-A Brutal
Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960-1973, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 1401
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Dialogue is more than giving residents and community members the
right to comment on proposals. At a minimum, dialogue should mandate
the actual participation of all the parties affected by the policies. Ideally,
dialogue needs to bring with it a commitment by all parties-including
those with the power to execute the policies-to actually consider and
incorporate into the policies the legitimate needs of all affected parties.
Rather than the state granting parties an opportunity to participate, the
emphasis should be a process whereby the state takes the necessary steps
to ensure actual participation by those parties.' 7 In this way, each
individual and group is "decentered" by being forced to look at the
problem from alternative points of view. 88 This process assumes that
no solution can be found by only one party-no matter how educated,
powerful, or creative. Because no party can achieve a result without
input from others, it is essential that dialogue takes place before the
parties craft a solution. 89 This type of dialogue, however, is not likely
to take place without paid professionals facilitating it.'90
(1995). For critiques of the lawyer-driven model, see GERALD L. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS
LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Anthony
V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOc. CHANGE 659 (1987-88); Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering
in the Field? On Mapping the Paths From Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157(1994). Analysis of anti-crime measures in public housing have focused almost
exclusively upon constitutional analysis. See supra note 5. This Article is an attempt to
illustrate how lawyers can further what Lopez refers to as the "rebellious lawycring"
approach to analyzing anti-crime measures in poor communities rather than a "regnant
lawyering" model. White, supra, refers to this as "collaborative" lawyering.
187. Jurgen Habermas promotes this type of reasoning in his discourse ethics. He
maintains that decisions are legitimated by the active participation of all affected parties.
A norm is valid only if "[a]ll affected parties can accept the consequences and the side
effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's
interests (and these consequences are preferred to those ofknown alternative possibilities)."
REHG, supra note 8, at 38.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 78-79.
190. Friere calls these professionals "investigators." Friere offers a specific
methodology for educated professionals to go into poor communities and learn from
residents about their lives. These investigators then go back into those same communities
and initiate dialogue designed to allow uneducated residents to speak with one another in
a way that will encourage them to analyze the conditions of their own experience. In such
an atmosphere, people from various stations in life learn with each other about the
conditions and needs of the poor communities. FRIERE, supra note 8.
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This dialogue process bears little relationship to the creation or
implementation of the current criminal trespass policy. In an ideal
process, residents, police ("beat" officers as well as superiors), housing
authority personnel (local staff as well as HUD officials), and community
members who have legitimate reasons to go on or near subsidized
housing property would solicit input from each other prior to devising
anti-crime policies. 9' Rather than a few individuals devising policies
and then requesting everyone else to agree, all parties would recognize
that they could design effective solutions only after engaging in
meaningful dialogue. Presumably, residents engaging in this process
would not feel that they had to choose between only bad alternatives;
guests would understand why police were present and what sort of
information they needed; and officers would understand and respect the
privacy and the community of the residents and their families.
The history of the Dayton policy suggests, by contrast, the
government initiated a "top-down" formation of the criminal trespass
policy. Litigation in other locations indicates a similar failure to
understand these diverse perspectives prior to formulating the trespass
policies.
Lawmakers based the subsidized housing statutes on the premise
that residents are to have a voice in shaping the major decisions that
affect residential life."9 This premise is deeply rooted in the democrat-
ic process upon which our society is based. While statutes and
regulations state this principle, very few resources have actually been
directed toward ensuring the widespread participation among residents,
housing management, and law enforcement, when formulating possible
191. Because every community is composed of its own residents, police, and housing
authority personnel, each community, after engaging in dialogue, may develop its own
distinct anti-crime policy.
192. For a discussion of the role of tenant participation in public housing, see Marvin
Krislov, Note, Ensuring Tenant Consultation Before Public Housing Is Demolished or
Sold, 97 YALE L.J. 1745 (1988). As Krislov notes, "[f]ederal regulations require tenant
consultation in a variety of contexts." Id. at 1751 n.47. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R § 942.25
(1995) (requiring PHAs to consult elderly and handicapped residents when promulgating
rules concerning pets); 24 C.F.R. § 961.3 (1995) ("The elimination of drug-related crime
and the problems associated with it in public housing developments requires the active
involvement and commitment of public housing residents. . . .'); 24 C.F.R. § 961.18
(1995) (stating that applicants for funds must give residents a "reasonable opportunity to
comment on its application for funding," and that "[t]he applicant must give these
comments careful consideration in developing its plan").
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anti-crime measures.93 Rather, resident participation is seen more as
a "right" of the tenants than as a necessary component to finding
workable solutions. This view colors how government seeks resident
participation. Viewed as a right, residents are given opportunities to
participate via posted meetings and resident elections, but many residents
appear not to avail themselves of these opportunities. Instead, housing
management and lawmakers should make a concerted effort to solicit
input and recommendations from residents. If participation were seen as
a necessary component to finding viable solutions, housing authorities
would seek resident participation much more vigorously.
In some communities, where residents and management are not
communicating well, the parties may have to hire people to knock on
residents' doors to gather their opinions regarding various crime-fighting
policies. In a pilot project in Dayton, Ohio, unrelated to the criminal
trespass policy, some efforts were made to include residents in a dialogue
about their community. While residents were not consulted in any
meaningful way about the criminal trespass policy, the DMHA did hire
a consulting firm to organize tenants and revitalize resident councils.'94
A former DMHA resident, who used grassroots, low-cost techniques to
engage public housing residents' participation, started the firm. Although
this plan could have been the beginning of a dialogue on more important
issues in DMHA, DMHA chose to end its affiliation with the consulting
193. Krislov argues that while "PHAs... can benefit from tenant consultation" they
often thwart meaningful participation by tenants in important decisions. Krislov, supra
note 192, at 1752-58 (citing PHA interference in Houston when tenants opposed
demolition of public housing).
194. In 1992, the DMHA hired Faison's Concepts to develop leadership abilities
among residents. Randy Faison and Angelique Faison went door to door asking residents
to participate in public housing governance. In "phase one" of their project, some of their
notable successes were: registering 900 public housing residents to vote; organizing
seminars and discussions on issues such as Roberts Rules of Order, community
development, criminal justice, wellness, drug prevention and intervention, and team
building. Unfortunately, DMHA cut off the funding for the Faisons just when they
believed they had begun to build a core group of participating tenants. Had the funding
continued, the Faisons planned to implement a series of workshops and events, including
involving residents in: counseling school children about drug use, providing emotional
support to children before and after school, providing after-school tutoring, choir-singing,
and an arts program. Additional leadership training, career development, bookkeeping and
management skills were also proposed. Speakers would be brought in to discuss criminal
justice, mental health, alternatives to violence, and other topics. Proposals and reports
from Faison's Concepts (on file with the author).
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firm. '9 This type of intensive, low-cost effort may be required to
obtain actual participation by residents.
Other subsidized housing communities are experimenting with
methods for increasing dialogue. Some are inviting police to be residents
in their communities. Such a practice would encourage more meaningful
dialogue between police and residents in an informal setting, and would
integrate the police and residents by making some of the members of one
group members of the other group, thus turning "them" into "us." Two
other practices include recruiting more police from low income
communities and communities of color, and amending federal housing
laws to allow resident councils to take over the management of
subsidized housing communities.1 96  This Article, however, recom-
mends a more explicit form of leadership in which a true participation
by a large percentage of residents is necessary to achieve a workable
solution.
Another benefit to the dialogue approach is that it allows residents,
housing personnel, and law enforcement to test how well the policies are
working. For example, there are a number of problems with the criminal
trespass policy that the partnership could explore: Should non-residents
be identified and if so, how? How will the community decide to
differentiate between non-residents who have a right to be on subsidized
housing property and those who do not? If the police are going to stop
suspicious individuals, what are the factors that might make someone
look suspicious? How can non-resident access be limited to assure
housing community safety without invading the residents' privacy?
Should there exist security to monitor all who come and go? Should that
security serve as a "bouncer" or a "turnstile?"' 97 The residents, police,
and housing staff are all likely to have different responses to these
questions. However, the different answers, considered together, might
lead to different housing policies. Rather than groups taking sides
195. While DMHA never gave a clear reason for terminating the consulting firm's
affiliation, both the consulting firm management and the Legal Aid attorneys who worked
with the resident councils reported that difficulties started when the resident councils'
corporate charters made no provision for oversight of the councils by DMHA.
196. See, e.g., Karlyn Barker, Work Starts on Ward 7 Clinic; "Forgotten Washington"
Has Waited Years for Drug Treatment Center, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1989, at B3 ("At
Kenilworth-Parkside, a public housing development, resident Kimi Gray established what
is considered to be a model of tenant management, an arrangement in which residents
manage the day-to-day operations of the project.").
197. Professor James Durham suggested this distinction to me.
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against one another, suspicious of the motives and actions of the others,
the groups could work out these answers cooperatively.
B. The Content of Dialogue
The history of laws that affect subsidized housing communities
suggests some specific underlying topics that should be considered by the
participants to the dialogue. An exploration of these topics might serve
as a basis for improved cooperation. Lawyers can serve an important
role in raising these historic legal issues and providing information to all
parties who wish to explore them. Certain underlying issues should be
discussed and worked out by affected parties prior to trying to reach
consensus on specific anti-crime measures in public housing:
1. Must residents and guests be forced to choose between liberty
and safety?
2. Can subsidized housing communities be protected without
resorting to practices that make the residents feel as though they are
living in a police state?
3. How does the history of racially oppressive laws and practices
affect modem anti-crime policies?
4. What difference does it make that most public housing heads of
households are poor women?
5. Do safety policies limit residents' abilities to rise out of poverty?
If the parties can begin to understand some of the issues raised by
these questions, dialogue may become more productive. While these are
not the only important issues worthy of discussion, they are examples of
how laws have affected perspectives and affected parties may be unaware
of the impact such laws have had on them. Moreover, traditional
litigation will not resolve these issues because it fails to raise most of
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them.' 98 Rather, lawyers should play a role in presenting these issues
to groups in public housing communities through a dialogue.
1. Must Residents and Guests Be Forced to Choose Between Liberty
and Safety?
For hundreds of years, people have articulated a desire to be secure
and free. Eighteenth century philosophers wrote of "natural rights" such
as "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Such rights were
incorporated into the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights
in our Constitution. Even though the concept of natural rights is not
universally accepted, most in American society desire to be secure in our
personal safety and free to exercise our will over our own actions. The
police play an essential role in securing our natural rights by protecting
us from harm, but, as a community, we also expect the police to honor
our freedom to go about our business of ordinary life.
Subsidized housing residents deserve no less. But, because their
constitutional concerns about liberty infringements are framed in relation
to public safety, public housing residents have reached the point where
they have to take a stand either for liberty or safety, but not both.
Without dialogue, decision-makers fail to consider residents' opinions
and they implement policies that severely limit resident freedoms in the
name of safety. As one scholar noted:
The liberty/community polarity is both a symptom and a
cause of the general tendency to think dualistically about
political questions that is a characteristic of American
constitutional decisionmaking. It acts as a foundational,
cognitive structure in constitutional theory that drastically
reduces the options open for choice when rights claims
are made by individuals; either the individual 'wins' in
what is taken to be a struggle with the community over
198. There are several potential litigation strategies to challenge a criminal trespass
policy other than the two constitutional doctrines explored later in this paper. See infra
part IV. Void for vagueness doctrines, procedural due process, and racial discrimination
are but three additional constitutional doctrines that might be raised. State analyses of the
criminal trespass statute itself might yield favorable results, particularly analysis of what
constitutes "privilege;" of state landlord-tenant theories of quiet enjoyment or federally
subsidized housing laws regulating how much a PHA or landlord can impinge upon
residents' rights to have guests; and whether or not resident comments were properly
solicited or considered. Unfortunately, each of these doctrines only addresses a small piece
of the problem which leads clients to seek help from lawyers in addressing the problems
such policies create.
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autonomy, or the community wins and proceeds to
submerge the person's being into the group personality of
the collectivity.... The model is one of combat or
struggle.
199
The sweeps policies in general, and the criminal trespass policy in
particular, appear in such dichotomous terms. Residents who have
consistently voiced their desire to be both safe and free have been forced
to choose a policy that compromises one interest over the other. Before
dialogue begins, affected parties should consider whether this need be the
case. Whoever controls the decision making process should ensure that
resident freedoms are just as important as resident safety, and vice versa.
Taken seriously, solutions might be found to protect residents' freedoms
to associate with whomever they please; to keep their business personal;
to move freely on their own property and not to worry about acquain-
tances or loved ones being harassed.2"e For example, if police had not
ignored residents' legitimate pleas for protection prior to the institution
of drug elimination policies, perhaps measures as drastic as a trespass list
would not have been considered necessary. If blatant disregard for the
law has lessened as a result of such police presence, perhaps those
creating new policies will understand that adequate police presence may
in fact make a bigger difference than the more drastic measures.
Subsidized housing residents have been given an all or nothing option:
either virtually no police protection or total police control.2"' For
them, neither alternative is acceptable.
Police might counter with a discussion of how difficult it is to
protect safety when residents are loathe to cooperate. Police officers can
protect more effectively if they know who the residents are and
something about them. Such a discussion might lead to some of the
reasons why some residents have difficulty trusting police officers or
199. Lind, supra note 7, at 1259-60 (footnotes omitted).
200. I have hesitated to propose any model solution because my point is that good
solutions cannot be crafted by any one person. One could imagine, however, solutions that
might preserve resident safety and liberty. For example, a policy favoring security checks
on everyone who entered a complex, providing some resident control over the reception
of visitors, might be less intrusive.
201. See, e.g., testimony of DMIA residents, Brown Transcript, Vol. 4, at 134-35,
describing how long it took police to respond to a complaint of a drug deal on a resident's
front porch. Residents believed they had the option of accepting the total police/DMHA
package, including the trespass policy, or going back to virtually no protection.
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housing authority personnel.2 2 Some of these reasons are discussed
below.
2. Can Subsidized Housing Communities Be Protected Without
Resorting to Practices that Make the Residents Feel as Though They
Are Living in a Police State?
Subsidized housing communities are neighborhoods, not battlefields.
While the blatant, open sale of drugs and use of guns had reached crisis
proportions in the late 1980's, newspaper accounts indicate that in many
locations these unusual activities have largely subsided, at least in the
open.203 Residents may wonder whether they and their guests should
be made to feel like criminals when they have done nothing wrong.
Practices such as requesting identification, frisking and taking photo-
graphs of suspicious looking people are similar to police state practices
when innocent people are subjected to them. If innocent people are
repeatedly subjected to such practices, the community may feel besieged
and residents may logically respond to police presence by moving in the
opposite direction. Such a response may well lead police to feel even
more suspicious, thus creating a vicious circle of distrust. Because police
encounters can be scary and dangerous to residents of public housing
202. As the Justice Department's study states: "Clearly, in many communities, police-
resident relations are tense, and there is distrust on both sides. Journalistic accounts of
housing developments into which police refuse even to enter also contribute to a picture
of police neglect in public housing.... The concept of'police responsiveness' is in fact
an amalgamation of a variety of factors: the frequency of patrol, response time,
effectiveness of police tactics ... sensitivity, concern, and cooperativeness." DUNWORTH
& SA1GER, supra note 2, at 57 (citations omitted).
203. See. e.g., Nancy Lawson, Paradise Revised Development: A Drug-Free Success
Story, WASH. TIMEs, July 5, 1991, at B3.
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communities,204 some communities have resorted to resident patrols or
other citizen patrol groups to minimize the police state atmosphere.
Some of these patrol groups are organized by local Nation of Islam
groups. 205  While the use of these groups has been controversial and
has had mixed success, some residents report increased feelings of
security and in some cases have fought to keep these patrols in
existence.0 6 Although different communities may want a different
204. Associate Professor Patricia Williams describes several examples ofracism linked
to the legal system. She examined racism as a crime (which she calls "spirit-murder") in
Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response
to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 127 (1987). Alex Kotlowitz describes an incident which
may have been spirit-murder in his account of a deadly tragedy between armed ATF
agents and a 19 year old, African-American man named Craig. The agents stopped Craig,
a high school graduate with a steady job, but the street was icy and when the agent slipped
on the ice his gun accidentally discharged and killed Craig. Craig's death affected 13 year
old Lafeyette, a neighbor and friend who also lived in the projects:
From that day on, [Lafeyette's mother] said, he started thinking, "I ain't doing
nothing, I could get killed, or if not get killed I might go to jail for something I
didn't do. I could die any minute, so I ain't going to be scared of nothing."
KOTLOWTrz, supra note 1, at 208-09.
205. At Paradise Manor and Mayfair Mansions in Washington, D.C., Nation of Islam
"Dopebusters" worked with police in 1988 to help clean up drug dealing. That project
also has a resident group called "Paradise Manor Control" that walks the project looking
for signs of drug activities. Lawson, supra note 202. See also Controversial Security
Force, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 3, 1992, at B3 ("Security guards affiliated with the Nation
of Islam are patrolling 14 federally subsidized housing projects in the crime-ridden
Oakwood section of Venice."); Benjamin Forgey, Paradise Reborn: Projects Transform
NE Complexes, Field, WASH. POsT, July 4, 1992, at D1 (describing Paradise Manor);
Gregory Freeman, Farrakhan Gives Mixed Messages, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 1,
1994, at 9B (reporting security agency founded by Nation of Islam ended drug dealing and
violence in housing complex); Clarence Page, Condemning Farrakhan Without Offering
Alternative Will Just Get us Ignored, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Feb. 18, 1994, at
A15 ("[T]he Chicago Housing Authority plans to contract Nation of Islam members to
patrol Rockwell [Gardens].. . ."); Adam Pertman, Nation ofIslam Walks Fine Line with
Blacks, BosToN GLOBE, Feb. 20, 1994, at 1 (crediting Nation of Islam security with
ending overt drug dealing and violence in Flag House Courts housing project in East
Baltimore); Jonathan Tilove, Divided Camps Claim Mantle of Malcolm X, Split Among
U.S. Black Muslims Mirrors Assassinated Leader's Life, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov.
22, 1992, at 4B ("Only last month, the Los Angeles Police Commission contracted with
the Nation to patrol 15 apartment projects.").
206. See also Ken Ellingwood, Security Firm Taken Off Venice Patrols, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1993, at B16. There has been a lot of criticism directed at cities that have used
Nation of Islam patrols in light of anti-semitic statements made by Nation of Islam leader
Louis Farrakhan. Some residents, however, appreciate the security while condemning the
anti-semitism; Freeman, supra note 204 ("'I don't pay any attention to that anti-Jewish
stuff,' says Jackson. 'But I do like what he says about taking control of your life.'...").
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style of protection, the police and residents need to discuss specifically
which types of security are necessary in their effort to develop effective
policies." 7
3. How Does the History of Racially Oppressive Laws and Practices
Affect Modem Anti-Crime Policies?
No discussion of American public housing policies can be produc-
tive without some acknowledgement of the role that race-based laws have
played in creating many of the problems which affected parties
experience. The list of racially conscious discriminatory policies that
have affected modem public housing projects is astounding. Before
dialogue can productively move forward to solve modem problems, it is
necessary to discuss how race-motivated practices helped create problems
in present-day projects and how modem conceptions of race continue to
affect the way residents, community members, police, and housing
authority staff view one another.
Most public housing units are located in the most economically
depressed, racially segregated neighborhoods in the center of American
cities. Historically, public housing projects were built in districts
represented by the least influential politicians. Catering explicitly to
racial politics, representatives from more affluent, powerful districts were
successful in ensuring that no projects were built in their back yards.
Thus, poor African-Americans and other non-whites were
disproportionately corralled into huge urban projects which helped create
a concentrated, racially segregated poverty.0 '
Racial segregation among the poor continues into the present day,
with white, middle-class communities continuing to fight the placement
But see HUD Orders City to Void Pact with Nation of Islam, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Nov. 11, 1995, at 16B (attempting to void contract because Nation of Islam not the low
bidder for security).
207. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court sanctioned modem police practices
because they may feel like police state tactics to some, see Mitchell, supra note 5, at n.l.
For a list of suggested procedures that may make residents in a community feel a part of
the crime-fighting process, see Meiring, supra note 5, at 534-35.
208. See John C. Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner Commission in
Retrospect-An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289, 1337 n.208 (1993); John 0. Calmore,
Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-the-Future Essay, 71 N.C.
L. REv. 1487, 1509-10 (discussing role of government mortgage assistance programs in
"creating, sponsoring, and perpetuating the racially segregated dual housing markets that
divide America").
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of subsidized housing communities in their neighborhoods. 09 In a
1992 report, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities stated that:
Nationwide, poor black and Hispanic households are
much more likely to live in deficient housing than poor
white households ... twenty-nine percent of all poor
black households-including both poor renters and poor
homeowners-lived in deficient housing. So did more
than one in five-twenty-three percent-of poor Hispanic
households. By contrast, thirteen percent of poor white
households lived in these conditions. °
When poverty is concentrated in racially segregated neighborhoods, the
surrounding neighborhood is affected negatively. Thus, more African-
American people suffer the peripheral effects of a downward economic
turn as a result of racial segregation. Poor whites are more likely to live
in economically healthy neighborhoods and less likely to be victimized
by a downturn in the economy.2 ' Racial discrimination continues to
affect the availability of employment, even without the difficulty people
have in finding and keeping jobs without access to reliable transportation
or childcare."' Unemployment is higher for black people even
considering education attainment, and black persons are twice as likely
as white persons to be unemployed, regardless of whether they dropped
out of high school, completed high school or completed college." 3
Historically, relations between police and black citizens have been
tense and sometimes violent. While there has been improvement in the
effort to increase the percentages of non-white officers in major police
forces, in 1990 the highest percentage of black officers on city police
forces was still only 78% of the black population percentage in that
city." 4 In Dayton, whose black population is around 40%, roughly 9%
209. Boger, supra note 208, at 1338.
210. PAUL A. LEONARD & EDWARD B. LAzERE, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL'Y
PRIoRmES, A PLACE TO CALL HOME: THE Low INCOME HOUSING CRISIS IN 44 MAJOR
METROPOLITAN AREAS 29 (1992).
211. See DOUGLASS. MASSEY &NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGRE-
GATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 115-47 (1993) (discussing the creation
of the underclass communities).
212. See, e.g., ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, AND UNEQUAL 107-33 (1992).
213. Id. at 233.
214. Id. at 236.
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of the police force is black.215 Nationally, instances of police harass-
ment of black men are well known: the beating of Rodney King, shown
continuously on national television, confirmed what many in the black
community had heard anecdotally was a frequent occurrence.21 6
Officers of the law were the means of enforcing slavery and
enforcing post-Civil War laws designed to keep African-American people
subjugated. These laws, written in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and
nineteenth centuries, created templates for police-citizen encounters in
black communities and vestiges of these practices continue in some
communities today. Chief Judge Emeritus of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., has classified
"the essence of the relevant colonial and antebellum Virginia cases and
statutes into ten basic, underlying precepts that formed the legal and
moral foundation of American slavery and early race-relations law."2 7
215. Id. at 209, 236; see also supra note 144 for additional statistics.
216. See infra note 298 and accompanying text for insight into the exclusive
harassment of African-American men by police.
217. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The 'Law OnlyAsAn Enemy. The
Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal
Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 975 (1992).
Judge Higginbotham's ten precepts are:
1. Inferiority: Presume, preserve, protect, and defend the ideal of the superiority
of whites and the inferiority of blacks.
2. Property: Define the slave as the master's property, disregard the humanity of
the slave except when it serves the master's interest, and deny slaves the fruits of
their labor.
3. Powerlessness: Keep blacks-whether slave or free-as powerless as possible
so that they will be submissive and dependent in every respect, not only to the
master, but to whites in general. To assure powerlessness, subject blacks to a
secondary system ofjustice with lesser rights and protections and greater punish-
ments than for whites.
4. Racial purity: Draw an arbitrary racial line and preserve white purity as thus
defined. Tolerate sexual relations between white men and black women; severely
punish sexual relations between white women and non-white men.
5. Manumission and Free Blacks: Limit and discourage manumission; minimize
the number of free blacks in the state. Confine free blacks to a status as close as
possible to slavery.
6. Family: Recognize no rights of the black family; destroy the unity of the black
family; deny slaves the right of marriage; demean and degrade black women, black
men, black parents, and black children; then condemn them for their conduct and
state of mind.
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In some respects, these precepts appear to have affected belief systems
that have been incorporated into modem police practices. 2,8 Traces of
them are undeniably present in practices that continue to curtail freedom
of movement and association, destroy the unity of the black family,
question non-Christian religious affiliation, and apply different standards
of justice. For example, requests for identification may be reminiscent
of laws in parts of colonial America which required African-Americans
to carry passes.1 9 Because of this history, African-Americans living
in concentrated poverty may feel that certain policies are excessively
demeaning or intrusive regardless of whether they are consciously
discriminatory. Practices that continue to uphold these historic principles
of discrimination should be reconsidered, not as a matter of "rights," but
as a matter of respect."0
7. Education: Deny blacks any education, including a knowledge of their culture,
and make it a crime to teach those who are slaves how to read or write.
8. Religion: Recognize no rights of slaves to define and practice their own
religion, to choose their own religious leaders, or to worship with other blacks.
Encourage them to adopt the religion of the white master and teach them that God
is white and will reward the slave who obeys the commands of his master here on
earth. Use religion to justify the slave's status on earth.
9. Liberty-Resistance: Limit blacks' opportunity to resist, rebel, or flee by
curtailing theirfreedom ofmovement, freedom of association, andfreedom of expres-
sion. Deny blacks the right to vote.
10. By Any Means Possible: Support any practice or doctrine from any source
whatsoever that maximizes the profitability of slavery, legitimizes racism, and
retaliate, frequently by means of violence, against those of both races who dare to
advocate abolition or who, by their speech or actions, deny the inherent inferiority
of blacks.
Id. at 957 & n. 1l (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
218. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, When the Curefor the Fourth Amendment is Worse than
the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 29 (1994) (quoting a Louisiana sheriff who stated his
officers would "stop everybody that we think has no business in the neighborhood....
It's obvious that two young blacks driving a rinky-dink car in a predominantly white
neighborhood ... they'll be stopped").
219. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment
on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1260 n.4 (1990) (citing A. LEON
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATrER OF COLOR, RACE & THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978)).
220. To appreciate the insulting nature of a police policy requesting identification from
black males exclusively, consider, for example, a hypothetical government policy to
eradicate a bug infestation by sending bug spray through the showers in people's homes
located in a predominantly Jewish community. Even if the government could show that
the policy was the most cost efficient way of eradicating these bugs and that it did not
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While residents and police appear to share a common goal of
fighting drug-related crimes, the community must acknowledge the racist
history behind American drug laws. Laws criminalizing a variety of
drugs were historically linked with various ethnic and racial groups:
The energy that has given impetus to drug control and
prohibition came from profound tensions among socio-
economic groups, ethnic minorities, and generations-as
well as the psychological attraction of certain drugs....
[T]he bad results of drug use and the number of drug
users have often been exaggerated for partisan advantage.
The most passionate support for legal prohibition of
narcotics has been associated with fear of a given drug's
effect on a specific minority.... [C]ocaine was supposed
to enable blacks to withstand bullets which would kill
normal persons and to stimulate sexual assault. Fear that
smoking opium facilitated sexual contact between Chinese
and white Americans was also a factor in its total prohibi-
tion. Chicanos in the Southwest were believed to be
incited to violence by smoking marihuana. 2"
Today, federal anti-drug laws differentiate between the use of crack and
powder cocaine, despite racial differences in the consumers of these
drugs. Consequently, there are significant racial disparities in punish-
ment for cocaine use.' 2 While the validity of these disparate laws is
controversial even among prominent African-Americans, it is clear that
a far greater percentage of blacks who use drugs are imprisoned for it
than whites who use the same drugs.t  Therefore, police who
intend to discriminate against Jews in the creation of this policy, nobody would question
the blatant disregard for a community's history that such a distasteful, symbolic proposal
would reflect. Basic human respect would defeat such a hideous policy. Likewise, the
modem practice of requiring identification solely from young black males, in light of the
African-American community's history which included the requirement that blacks carry
passes, constitutes a disrespectful, symbolic remnant of an oppressive past.
221. DAVID F. MUSTO, M.D., THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC
CONTROL 244-45 (1973).
222. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991) (discussing the racially
discriminatory effect of drug sentencing laws).
223. powell and Hershenov state: "Fully eighty to ninety percent of drug arrests
nationwide involve African-American males, despite the fact that separate studies by the
FBI and the National Institute for Drug Abuse came to the 'identical conclusion that blacks
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encounter black men in housing projects are more likely to find a written
record of criminal activity than similar encounters with white men.
Victims of drug crimes are also disproportionately black, and this fact
must be credited in seriously addressing solutions. 4
Finally, police departments were once traditionally patronage jobs
-relatively low pay, low education jobs composed of men of the same
European ethnic backgrounds as those with political clout. Legislatures
and courts, however, have imposed affirmative action remedies upon
many of these police departments over the past twenty-five years. Thus,
particular racial tensions may exist amongst police officers and between
officers and civil rights organizations.
All of these race-based policies and practices have contributed to the
difficult and testy relationships that often exist between subsidized
housing residents and the police. Unless affected parties begin to talk
through some of these issues, they will continue to fester under the
surface of police-citizen encounters in these neighborhoods.
4. What Difference Does It Make that Most Public Housing Heads of
Households Are Poor Women?
Community-based policing requires a consistently high level of
cooperation between residents and police officers. Because most public
housing residents are women who receive Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), police officers will need to understand the
potential threat their presence might pose to these women.225 Single
mothers who receive AFDC and other public benefits, including
make up only 12% of the nation's drug users."' Further, "former federal drug czar
William Bennett [acknowledged] that '[t]he typical cocaine user is white, male, a high
school graduate employed full time ..."' powell and Hershenov, supra note 5, at 610
(footnote omitted).
224. See Kennedy, supra note 75, at 1278 (noting that a policy protecting "lawabiding
blacks" will increase the rate of incarceration of blacks).
225. See Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency"fromn a Different
Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961 (1993) (referring to the "double-binds" experienced by women
on welfare). In her analysis of threats to poor women's emotional and physical well-being,
Professor White discusses three strategies used by women in South Central Los Angeles
to cope with the shame of poverty and the violence inherent in alternative choices. These
strategies are: preemption (expect to be judged), evasion of harm from institutional
authorities, and self-medication (through television, sleep, and drugs). Id. at 1990-99. The
women in public housing appear to face double-binds in determining whether they can or
should cooperate with community based police. Cooperation might lead to risk of
economic or psychic harm, but failure to cooperate might lead to increased physical
violence.
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subsidized housing itself, must adhere to a large number of federal and
state eligibility requirements. Among other things, these requirements
limit who can live in a household, how much income can come into a
household and from what source and how many assets a family can have.
Historically, women on welfare have had little privacy. This
country has a long history of punishing poor women who have "frequent
or continuing sexual relations" with a man to whom they are not
married.226 As late as 1968, for example, twenty states had "man-in-
the-house" rules which denied AFDC to any woman who "cohabited"
with a man,227 which did not necessarily mean he lived in the
house.28i Moral character requirements have ceased to be an overt
prerequisite for obtaining benefits such as welfare and Food Stamps, in
part because such disqualification provisions "were habitually used to
disguise systematic racial discrimination." 229 Although public housing
landlord-tenant law prohibits interference with any guests of residents
regardless of marital statusPo and public housing definitions of "house-
hold" include non-married individuals,"' housing authorities still
inquire about the details of residents' personal lives. If a woman tenant
receiving welfare has a live-in boyfriend, she could lose her benefits
because of failure to report status, income, or household composition to
caseworkers.
226. For a discussion of this history, see King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311-13 (1968),
which held the "man-in-the-house" rule violated the Federal welfare law and thus did not
reach the constitutional issues.
227. For a list of these twenty states, see id. at 338-39 (Douglas, J., concurring).
228. In Alabama, a man and woman are considered to cohabitate if they "have 'fre-
quent' or 'continuing' sexual relations," which could mean "once a week.., once every
three months ... [or] once every six months.. ." even though the man might live
elsewhere. Id. at 314.
229. Id. at 321-22. For a detailed discussion of overt racial discrimination in early
benefits programs, see Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modifi-
cation Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992).
230. See McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 647 F.2d 332, 335 (2d Cir. 1981) (con-
cluding a rule requiring tenants to inform their landlord of overnight visitors was
overbroad); Lancor v. Lebanon Hous. Auth., 760 F.2d 361, 363 (1st Cir. 1985) (same).
231. See Shelby D. Green, The Public Housing Tenancy: Variations on the Common
Law that Give Security of Tenure and Control, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 681, 736 (1994)
("HUD adopted regulations prohibiting PHAs from establishing or implementing tenant
selection criteria that exclude persons from public housing because they are welfare
recipients, are unwed mothers, have a nontraditional family composition, or have not lived
as a family for a particular duration.") (footnotes omitted).
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In addition, a police officer who knows too much about a family
might intrude in several ways. He might discover some familial
indiscretion such as a relative who is temporarily residing with a family
until new housing is found, or money made from playing cards that
occasionally allows the family to buy new clothes. Similarly, an officer
might misinterpret innocent activity by concluding that a boyfriend who
sleeps over one or two nights a week is living with the family, or by
assuming a regular babysitter, who has three children of her own, is a
member of the family. In such instances, an officer might call child
protective services to investigate these "overcrowded" conditions. In any
case, the family might spend months, if not years, fighting legal battles
just to preserve the welfare benefits the family needs to survive.
Families who are threatened with a benefits cut-off are typically in
such a situation because of landlord information, law enforcement
information, or information provided by other residents. Because
eligibility requirements change, it is difficult to know precisely what is
allowed and what is not. Therefore, rational behavior would lead these
women to keep their personal business private. Moreover, historic
policing of the morals of those women who receive benefits might lead
to even less trust of police or housing authority personnel.
Police and housing authority staff need to understand the effect their
role as "welfare benefits police" plays in preventing closer cooperation
with residents. Consideration of the relationship between fighting serious
violent crime and fighting less serious "benefits crimes" might be
discussed.
In addition, domestic violence and the role of women in society also
play a role in these police-citizen encounters. While responses to
complaints of domestic violence are important, women might be reluctant
to call police officers for help if they feel the police will overstep their
role and substitute their own judgments for those of the women involved.
Thus, when an officer notifies a boyfriend that he cannot return to the
housing site because a woman sought assistance to have him removed
from her apartment, the officer is refusing that woman's right to
determine who she can invite to her apartment in the future. Even
though a victim of domestic violence may not have a say in prosecution
of the battery crime, she still retains the choice of whether to invite the
person back to her house in the future. For instance, a woman may
invite the perpetrator back into her house if he has received counseling
or other help. When officers assert their power to prevent visits from
men who have not even been charged with a crime, they seize power
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from a woman. In the case of a public housing resident, they seize
power from a woman who has little power in the first place.
5. Do Safety Policies Limit Residents' Abilities to Rise Out of
Poverty?
People who live in poverty should not be prevented from improving
their economic situation because of government policies. Yet anti-crime
measures such as criminal trespass policies may unwittingly interfere
with residents' efforts to improve their ability to work or obtain an
education by making the arrangement of child daycare difficult. Adult
women cannot work unless they have adequate care for their children.
Typically, such care comes from friends and extended family members,
and often that care comes from the fathers of the children. Any policy
which prevents caretakers from having easy access to resident households
may destroy the opportunities some women have to find or keep a job
or to stay in school. Caretakers are essential because some of these low-
wage jobs are in the evening. In addition, if a poor family does not have
a private phone, caretakers may need to use the public pay telephones to
maintain contact with the working parent. Because these pay phones are
in public housing common areas, caretakers who use the phone may
violate a criminal trespass policy.
Furthermore, teenage children living in subsidized housing may also
seek work or attend school themselves. Many of these teens will not
have automobiles, and may rely upon friends from outside the housing
community to provide them with transportation. If these teens or their
friends are harassed or prevented from coming onto housing property, the
teens may lose their jobs or drop out of school.
Affected parties should discuss how police practices will affect the
ability of residents to hold jobs or obtain an education. Policies that
interfere with this ability should be seen as unworkable; it is unaccept-
able for any of the parties to enact policies that keep poor people poor.
C. Problems with the Dialogue Method
This section has described how affected parties can use the dialogue
method to create and test anti-crime policies in subsidized housing
communities. There are five sets of issues that ought to be addressed by
affected parties when they engage in such dialogue. There are, however,
several potential problems with the dialogue method.
First, not all affected parties may be willing to engage in dialogue.
Police departments and housing authority staff may see such a process
as a waste of valuable time. Believing they have solutions that can
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work, they may fail to see the benefit to what will probably be a slow,
cumbersome and tense process. It may be incumbent upon lawyers who
represent community groups or residents to persuade government actors
that the dialogue method will produce superior results. Perhaps public
interest lawyers can use the emphasis on "local control" and community
based policing to convince local government actors that solving tough
problems will require real input from all people involved.
It may be equally difficult to persuade residents and community
members to participate in such dialogue. People may feel that more
"talk" and less "action" are not worth their time. The benefits of
policing discussed above may give women residents reasons not to make
affirmative connections with the housing authority, staff, or police.
Moreover, jobs, school, demands of children, and demands made by the
government may persuade many residents that there is simply not enough
time to participate in this activity. Prior to engaging in dialogue,
residents may need to be convinced that the people with whom they
make the policies will actually consider their ideas.
Public interests lawyers who are asked to represent residents or
community groups may need to encourage these clients to speak with
their neighbors and friends about participating. In Dayton, community
organizers were successful in engaging public housing residents in a
variety of activities, which suggests that if residents believe their
participation will be heard and considered, they will participate.
Additionally, just as public interest lawyers would not hesitate to knock
on doors to investigate facts for constitutional litigation, attorneys may
need to knock on doors to investigate people's opinions about anti-crime
policies and participation.
Ultimately, however, to have real participation by many residents
and community members, government actors will have to pay communi-
ty organizers to solicit input. Public interest attorneys can play a role in
fashioning settlement proposals that include salaries for such organizers.
Because constitutional litigation will be timely, expensive, and likely to
result in a remedy that satisfies no one, public interest attorneys might
agree to delay such litigation if the government would agree to fund the
dialogue process as a means to resolve policy differences.
Another critique of the dialogue method is that it has no place in
our current jurisprudence. It may trouble clients to be asked by their
lawyers to abandon the only set of legal theories that have traditionally
offered any relief: those based upon the Constitution.
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However, the dialogue approach might work alongside other
traditional legal strategies. Public interest attorneys might use a
perspectives approach in understanding the issues prior to deciding
whether litigation is appropriate. As suggested above, attorneys might
suggest the dialogue approach as an alternative to litigation in a
settlement posture. Nevertheless, if litigation is chosen, the refusal of the
state to seriously attempt such dialogue might be used to defeat a claim
that the policies meet a legitimate societal need. In doing so, public
interest attorneys might hire an expert to poll affected groups and present
a sophisticated analysis of perspectives on a proposed policy. Such an
analysis might include alternate solutions suggested by affected parties
to achieve the same anti-crime goals of the policy under attack, but
without the more negative effects. Presented with such an analysis, a
court might be reluctant to uphold the policy if it can be shown that large
numbers of people find the policy intrusive and alternate methods can
attain the same goals. Robert Hayman, Jr. has written that constitutional
law needs new traditions based upon dialogue, pluralism, and multi-
culturalism that finds its roots in Critical Race Theory.232 Dialogue
about the types of issues that are implicated in anti-crime measures might
serve as a springboard for the creation of such a tradition.
Another concern in using the dialogue method is that participants
will reach solutions that fail to sufficiently protect minority needs. The
great benefit to constitutional rights strategies, it is said, is that they
protect the minority from a tyrannical majority. Although Habermas233
and Friere" 4 have built in some protections for minorities, there are
some possible pitfalls in their methods. Habermas' method depends
upon the involvement of all "affected parties," but if some person or
group is left out of the definition of affected parties, then their needs do
not have to be considered. For example, a person, who comes to public
housing for the sole purpose of selling drugs to minors, should not be
permitted to express his viewpoint in fashioning anti-crime policies.
After all, combatting drugs is the goal. But who decides which goals are
legitimate and which are not? Who decides which outside parties have
legitimate interests in the outcome and which do not? Who decides that
232. Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and
Postmodern Constitutional Traditionalism, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 57 (1995).
233. For discussion of Habermas' theory, see REHG, supra note 8.
234. FRIERE, supra note 8.
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there are so many participants that discussion is just too unwieldy to
yield results? As Rehg states:
[I]t is almost always impossible to carry on a discourse
with all those possibly affected by a decision, even in a
restricted context of application. ... The problem is
reinforced when one inquires into the possibility of
elaborating need interpretations, eliminating power
differentials among the participants, and so on ....
Perhaps such decisions are for the courts to make. Rather than balancing
interests themselves, the courts could assume the role of determining who
must participate in interest balancing. While this is not a perfect
solution, it could provide some independent oversight of these important
decisions.
A final concern might be that the dialogue process is too time-
consuming for creating an on-going policy in a crisis situation. If all
affected parties had to engage in the process each time a change was
made in the policy, it is conceivable that no policy would ever result.
A committee-like structure is time-consuming. However, Rehg suggests
that as long as assurances are made that all relevant perspectives are
considered, quicker procedures, rather than actual dialogue, could be
employed. 26 Such procedures could involve the use of experts, public
debate followed by a vote, or the use of committees. Certainly it is not
possible to engage all affected parties in dialogue all of the time. Thus,
decisions reached should be acknowledged to "incorporate[] a common
interest at the present point in time and according to the present state of
knowledge." 7 Nonetheless, in situations that involve public housing
communities, this Article argues that actual, extended dialogue between
affected parties must take place initially before more expedient routes are
chosen. Too many people have spoken in lieu of residents, visitors, and
police for too long for a shorter version to be effective. In the long-run,
however, quicker measures could be instituted if larger dialogue is
allowed to occur at regular intervals. Such details would depend upon
the history of particular communities and the level of communication that
actually exists at any point in time.
235. REHG, supra note 8.
236. REHG, supra note 8, at 196 ("To arrive at timely decisions in real cases,
especially in more urgent issues, time-constrained institutional procedures are required.").
237. Id. at 190 (footnote omitted).
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IV. A LOOK AT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Despite efforts to facilitate dialogue, public interest lawyers working
with clients who are unhappy with anti-crime measures may need to turn
to constitutional litigation. Although the issues raised in the previous
section of this Article can be raised in constitutional litigation, they can
only be raised peripherally.238 This section will examine two constitu-
tional doctrines to determine how it might be possible to incorporate the
issues suggested by the perspectives examined in section II. I conclude,
however, that constitutional litigation of these policies offers poor and
incomplete remedies for each of the parties involved.
The two constitutional doctrines this section will explore are the
Fourth Amendment doctrine relating to police-citizen encounters and the
First and Fourteenth Amendment doctrines relating to a citizen's right to
associate with friends and family members. Analysis of these doctrines
will illustrate the limitations inherent in constitutional doctrines when
parties are evaluating, guiding or developing policies to help resolve
community conflicts arising out of programs such as criminal trespass
policies. The analysis will show, however, circumstances in which it
might be possible to use the litigation forum to raise relevant issues with
the courts, opposing parties, and the community.
A. Fourth Amendment
The key constitutional challenge to the criminal trespass policy, and
other sweeps policies, is whether the policy violates citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights.239 The criminal trespass policy raises several
discrete Fourth Amendment questions: Upon what basis can law
238. If the issues that are of concern to residents, lawful visitors, and law enforcement
officials are not easily raised by constitutional doctrines, then perhaps those constitutional
doctrines are flawed. See Richard B. Saphire, The Search for Legitimacy in Constitutional
Theory: What Price Purity, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 380-81 (1981) (arguing that the
Constitution should serve as a "crucible . . . for moral dialogue" in society but
acknowledges the problems associated with determining whose morality should govern).
I would argue that until the needs, opinions, and views of people affected by government
policies are sought after by those who create constitutional doctrine, the moral legitimacy
of constitutional doctrine is in grave danger. This is especially true when those most
disenfranchised from the government are not consulted.
239. The Fourth Amendment states "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated .. " U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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enforcement stop suspicious individuals? If an initial stop is lawful, how
long and for what purposes can the officer detain the individuals? Upon
what basis may the officers lawfully issue a notice of trespass? If
notices are improperly given, is a subsequent arrest for trespass lawful?
If such notices are properly given, upon what basis may an officer
subsequently stop individuals, question them, detain them, or arrest them
for criminal trespass? The answers to these questions are far from clear.
The heart of the criminal trespass policy involves police officers
stopping people whom they believe should not be on the public housing
site. The goal of the program is to prevent people from coming onto
public housing properties unless they have a legitimate reason to be
there. The police and housing authority personnel believe that they will
reduce crime by keeping out these "extraneous" people, and residents
will be safer.
Any program that involves police officers stopping people,
questioning them, and possibly arresting them is potentially violative of
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. To analyze whether a
particular practice violates the Fourth Amendment, a lawyer must
determine whether the police stops are governed by normal requirements
of individualized suspicion, or are part of a "special needs" administra-
tive program that does not require individualized suspicion. If the policy
falls within normal, individualized suspicion requirements, many
opportunities exist for constitutional challenges. However, if the policy
falls within the special needs category, it is highly unlikely that a court
will find constitutional violations. Criminal trespass policies appear to
fall squarely within the normal requirements of individualized suspicion.
The very nature of the programs require individual police officers to
assess whether individual people should be stopped, listed, or arrested.
To comply with the Fourth Amendment requirement that persons
cannot be seized unreasonably, the Supreme Court has directed police
officers to detain a person only after obtaining a warrant or, if obtaining
a warrant is impracticable, only after observing the person commit some
act that the officer can articulate as suspicious of criminal activity.240
However, if the government can demonstrate that "special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
240. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (addressing Fourth Amendment issues
concerning police stopping citizens on the street).
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cause requirement impracticable," '24 a search or seizure might be found
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.242 While it is unclear
whether a criminal trespass policy might ultimately be upheld under the
special needs cases, any such program that allowed suspicionless stops
would clearly be defeated unless certain characteristics were present. To
uphold such a program, the government would have to ensure that the
police officers have no discretion about whom they select to stop.
Further, the government would have to provide affected persons with a
clear notice about the program and how it operated. These requirements
would indicate that any such program would have to be in writing and
available to the public.243
The criminal trespass policies reflected in appellate cases and district
court lawsuits do not meet these criteria. In Dayton, the written policy
requires the officers to have individualized suspicion of criminal activity
pursuant to Terry before making any stops.244  However, officers
clearly have discretion about whom to stop; about whether to issue a
notice of trespass if the person is not on the list; and about whether to
arrest the person if they are on the list.245
241. Vemonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391 (1995) (holding that
a public school can require athletes to submit to urinalysis to test for drug use without
individualized suspicion of drug use).
242. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (holding brief stops
at sobriety checkpoints where no suspicion of criminal activity exists are reasonable
seizures and thus do not violate the Fourth Amendment); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding federal regulations that require railroad
engineers to submit to drug tests each and every time there is an accident do not violate
the Fourth Amendment); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989) (allowing government to require drug tests for any employee who is involved with
the interdiction of drugs or use of firearms); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)
(permitting government to inspect vehicles without individualized suspicion where periodic
inspections occur in a highly regulated commercial setting); Camara v. Municipal Court
of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (finding traditional probable cause standard
unworkable in a building inspection and that the Court should balance the need to search
against the invasion created by the search).
243. It is certainly possible to envision a program that restricts access to public
housing sites that would meet at least part of the special needs criteria. For example,
residents could be required to carry ID cards and visitors could be required to check in at
a central location or have visitors passes. Each and every person who enters a public
housing site could be checked for a pass. Such a program would be non-discretionary and
would, I believe, be more fair than the criminal trespass approach.
244. See infra notes 248-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of Terry v. Ohio.
245. Some might question my conclusion that these programs do not fall within the
special needs category. David E.B. Smith outlines two models of constitutional
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If officers enforcing criminal trespass programs have to articulate a
reasonable suspicion when stopping suspects, then what rights do the
suspects have when confronted by police? The Supreme Court has
articulated that ordinary citizens may walk away from police officers and
refuse to speak with those officers if they so choose.246 Supreme Court
cases which purport to delineate how a person would know if he or she
were involuntarily, rather than voluntarily, detained are inconsistent,
creating what Professor Maclin refers to as "the mystical line beyond
which police conduct is deemed sufficiently 'intimidating' to cause a
person to believe that she is not free to leave." '247
Analysis of police stops begins with the landmark case of Terry v.
Ohio.248  In that case, the Supreme Court departed from the prior
principle that an officer must have probable cause that a person has
committed a crime before stopping to question that person. Instead, the
Court held that an officer can stop and question anyone if the officer has
a "reasonable articulable suspicion" that the person has committed a
crime.249 The Court, however, grappled with the question of whether
a "stop" is the same as a "seizure." The Court stated:
Street encounters between citizens and police officers are
incredibly rich in diversity. They range from wholly
jurisprudence articulated by the Supreme Court-the "home" model and the "adminis-
trative" model. Smith, supra note 5, at 514. He argues that sweeps policies can be found
to be constitutional or unconstitutional depending upon which model the Court chooses to
follow. Id. at 546. While the criminal trespass programs have an overarching government
need (fighting crime and illegal drugs) and consist of a large-scale, planned program, the
amount of discretion granted to police officers eliminates it from the special needs
category.
246. When a police officer stops an individual and asks a few questions, there is not
a Fourth Amendment violation because the police officer has not seized that individual.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). "'Only when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may
we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."' Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19
n.16 (1968)). See also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990);
Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 560 (1980); Wainwright v. City of New
Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1968).
247. Maclin, supra note 219, at 1265 (footnote omitted).
248. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
249. Id. at 22. Because there is a governmental interest in crime prevention, police
officers may approach an individual when investigating a crime even though the police
officer has no probable cause. Id.
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friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutually useful
information to hostile confrontations of armed men
involving arrests, or injuries, or loss of life.... Encoun-
ters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of
purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire
to prosecute for crime."
The Court was unwilling either to state that officers have discretion
to question whomever they please, or that police officers must always be
able to articulate a reasonable suspicion prior to any citizen contact. In
doing so, the Court has created the fiction of the right to walk away.251
The distinction between the "right to inquire" line of cases and the
"Terry-stop" line of cases rests upon the premise that citizens will know
whether or not they have that right to walk away. 2  The police are
under no obligation, however, to inform a stopped person that he or she
has such a right in a given situation. 3 In Terry, the Court stated: "[I]t
must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."2 4
A seizure occurs when a person does not feel free to leave because the
officer "by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some
way restrained the liberty of [that person]."25  The Court defined
"show of authority" and "restraint" in later cases in ways that make it
difficult for the average person to know whether he or she has been
250. Id. at 13 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
251. Id. at 16; id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 34 (White, J., concurring)
("[N]othing ... suggests that the respondent had any objective reason to believe that she
was not free to ... proceed on her way.").
252. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,555 (1980). For a detailed discussion
of the right to inquire doctrine, see Maclin, supra note 218, at 1266-77, and Richard A.
Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of 'Stop' and 'Arrest,' 43 OHIO
ST. LJ. 771 (1982).
253. Some argue that police should be required to inform citizens of their right to walk
away if no reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists prior to the stop; this would have
the effect of "Mirandizing" this area of the law. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 252,
at 797-802. Absent such a requirement, the right to walk away does not, in my opinion,
exist for most people.
254. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (emphasis added).
255. Id. at 19 n.16. As Professor Maclin points out, there is virtually no difference
in real encounters between an officer's "request" and "demand," for an individual's
identification. Maclin, supra note 219, at 1299-1300 n.198.
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shown authority or restrained. 6 In Wainwright v. City of New
Orleans," the Court further mystified these questions. In that case,
the police stopped the defendant because he matched a general descrip-
tion of a murder suspect, but he refused to produce identification and
exercised his right to walk away. 8  The police arrested him for
resisting arrest, and subsequently for loitering and "reviling the
police."' 59 On appeal of his conviction on all three counts, Wainwright
argued that a person cannot be convicted of resisting arrest when the
initial stop was unlawful.260 Without explanation, the Court simply
dismissed the appeal, upholding the underlying conviction.26'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan stated that the only issue
was whether the defendant used "an unreasonable amount of force in
resisting what on this record must be regarded as an illegal attempt by
the police to search his person." 262 However, this issue is not resolved
because the majority of justices found there was insufficient information
in the record to make any decision.263  This case demonstrates the
uncertainty and confusion the Supreme Court has over what rights a
person has to refuse to speak with police officers.
Twelve years later, in United States v. Mendenhall,264 the Supreme
Court began to define when a citizen has the right to walk away.265
256. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-36 (1991); U.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 220-21 (1984).
257. 392 U.S. 598 (1968).
258. Id. at 600.
259. Id. at 601.
260. Id. at 598 (Harlan, J., concurring).
261. Initially, the Supreme Court granted Mr. Wainwright's Writ of Certiorari. Wain-
wright v. City of New Orleans, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967). Eventually, the Court issued a per
curiam report stating: "The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted." 392
U.S. 598 (1968). Justice Harlan and Justices Fortas and Marshall joined in two separate
concurring opinions, and Justices Douglas and Warren wrote two separate dissenting
opinions. Id.
262. Id. at 598.
263. Id. at 598, 600.
264. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
265. Although Mendenhall launched the most recent line of right to inquire cases,
Professor Maclin traces its modem origins to a concurring opinion in Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). Maclin, supra note 219, at 1266. InBrinegar, Justice Burton
concurred with the majority opinion which held probable cause to search an automobile
existed, but would have additionally held that probable cause was not necessary because
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The Court grappled with a drug courier profile in a public airport con-
course.2" Federal agents, not wearing uniforms nor displaying weap-
ons, approached the defendant and asked to see her airline ticket and
identification.267 After the agents returned the ticket and identification
to Mendenhall, she followed the agents to a Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) office located within the airport, where the agents asked to search
her purse and herself. ' The defendant agreed to the search and the
agents found two packages of heroin.269
Although the Court did not reach a majority opinion in Mendenhall,
a majority of justices did find that a seizure had occurred. However,
Justice Stewart, who delivered the opinion, found that no seizure took
place because the agents were in a public place and showed no
agents had "a positive duty to investigate" under the circumstances. 338 U.S. at 179.
There was at least an articulable suspicion to stop the car, as evidenced by the fact that
a majority held that probable cause existed. As Professor Maclin noted, "For Justice
Burton law enforcement officers were required to make a stop when they had a mere
'reasonable ground for an investigation."' Maclin, supra note 219, at 1267 (quoting
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 179 (Burton, J., concurring)). While this concern could have been
merely an anticipation of Terry eighteen years later, the statement mirrors the struggle the
Supreme Court would later show in wanting to allow law enforcement officers leeway in
investigating crime by speaking with citizens, but without giving those officers the freedom
to question citizens without limitation.
266. The drug courier profile is a list of characteristics purported to be shared by drug
couriers (as well as innocent citizens). Because local law enforcement departments each
develop their own profiles, some traits "known" to exist among drug couriers in some
locations are apparently the opposite of traits targeted in other locations. See Justice
Marshall's dissent in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989):
Reflexive reliance on a profile of drug courier characteristics runs a far greater risk
than does ordinary, case-by-case police work of subjecting innocent individuals to
unwarranted police harassment and detention. This risk is enhanced by the profile's
'chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations.'
Id. at 13 (citation omitted). Justice Marshall then cites several examples of contradictory
profiles illustrating their arbitrary, meaningless nature. For example, one profile may
target those individuals who deplane first, while another targets those who deplane in the
middle or last; similarly, one profile may target those who fly nonstop while others target
those who change planes; one targets those who fly round trip, while others target those
who fly one-way; one targets those who act nervously, while others look for those acting
calmly. Id. at 13-14.
267. Mendenhall, 466 U.S. at 547-48.
268. Id. at 548.
269. Id. at 549.
270. Id. at 566 (White, J., dissenting).
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weapons.27" ' He reasoned that Mendenhall voluntarily complied with
the DEA agents' request because she should have known she could have
simply walked away.272 Presumably, Justice Stewart thought that
escorting her to the airport DEA office was not a show of authority
anticipated by Terry.
A majority of justices in Florida v. Royer2 3 adopted Justice
Stewart's reasoning in Mendenhall. Royer repeats earlier holdings that
the police are free to question citizens, and that if those citizens are free
to leave, no Fourth Amendment seizure has taken place.274 In Royer,
a majority of justices found that the defendant had not been free to leave
because the agents, after initially requesting the defendant's identification
and airline ticket, asked him to follow them into another room and they
did not return his belongings.275 The remarkable aspect in Royer is
that most of the justices found that the original request for identification
was not a seizure,2 76 which arguably conflicts with the normal under-
standing of the words show of authority and restraint.
Accordingly, by the time the Court decided Royer, police could
request identification and question an individual with no need for
suspicion at all, and no Fourth Amendment protections applied. As
several commentators have pointed out, such requests for "papers" are
more reminiscent of a police state than a democracy:
[I]t is unsettling that without any cause, the police can
come up to any of us and ask for identification. It's just
too much like being asked for our "papers," especially in
a society that so values autonomy from government and
to just be left alone.. . . [I]t is hard to accept that we are
really free to go when such a 'request' is made .... A
law enforcement officer is not like some street leafleteer
who, if you refuse her offering, will go on to the next
271. Id. at 555.
272. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980).
273. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
274. Id. at 497-98.
275. Id. at 501-02. The circumstances "amount to a show of official authority such
that 'a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."' Id. at 502
(quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, (1980)). The Court concluded that
Royer was not free to walk away because the agents retained his identification, ticket, and
luggage. Id. at 503 n.9.
276. Id. at 504.
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person. How do you really walk away from the po-
lice?2 77
The erosion of the right to walk away was completed in two
Supreme Court cases: INS v. Delgado27 and Florida v. Bostick."9
The Court signalled that police may request identification--even in a
large scale planned program-without any individual articulable
suspicion of wrongdoing, and in situations where the persons questioned
cannot physically leave.
In the Delgado case, INS agents were posted at worksite exits while
on-duty employees were systematically asked for identification.28 No
seizure took place because these employees were held to know they
could refuse to respond, although they literally could not walk away.28" '
In Bostick, armed officers requested identification from a passenger on
a bus about whom they had no articulable suspicion.282 The Court,
however, refused to consider whether the police seized Bostick.283 The
Court shifted its emphasis from whether the citizens could actually leave
to whether they felt they could refuse to respond, but "psychological
pressure" to respond did not render the responses involuntary.284
The Delgado and Bostick cases raise an interesting question: why
did the Court choose not to simply state that people are required to speak
to the police? The Court appears to need the rhetoric of a person's right
to walk away to maintain the fiction that such encounters are not seizures
in order to prevent Fourth Amendment protections from coming into
play. This doctrine is truly a maze that could not possibly be understood
by an ordinary enforcement officer or person on the street.285
277. Mitchell, supra note 5, at 54 (footnotes omitted). See also Maclin, supra note
219, at 1265 ("The right of the people to come and go as they please-their right of
locomotion-is no longer as broad as the people might assume.").
278. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
279. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
280. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212-13.
281. Id. at 219-20.
282. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431-32.
283. Id. at 437. Rather, the Court concluded the Florida Supreme Court erred in its
decision because it only considered one factor--that the encounter occurred on a bus-and
did not consider the totality of the circumstances. Id.
284. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.
285. It appears to be an example of what Greg McCann, David Tarbert and Michael
Lenetsky label "the problem of indeterminacy." They write:
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How does the right to walk away/right to inquire doctrine translate
in criminal trespass policy encounters? An innocent person would have
no way of knowing whether he or she could lawfully walk away or
refuse to respond to police questions. For example, assume that an
innocent person is walking down the street wearing a maroon and green
T-shirt with white polka dots. He has dark hair and dark skin and is in
an all white neighborhood. Two white police officers are patrolling and
do not recognize him. They approach him on foot, with weapons on but
not drawn, and ask for identification. Under this hypothetical, the
Supreme Court would say that this citizen may refuse to answer their
questions and could leave, notwithstanding the psychological pressure
that might attend a decision to defy armed authority in a strange
neighborhood, not knowing how these particular police officers might
react.
Now assume that just prior to spotting our innocent citizen the
police hear on the radio that a man in a green and maroon T-shirt with
white polka dots was seen leaving a house which was just robbed. In
this scenario, the police may approach our innocent citizen with
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. If this citizen refuses to answer
questions and tries to leave he may be guilty of obstructing justice. In
this hypothetical, the innocent man has no way of knowing whether the
police have reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or just don't like the
way he looks. He has no way of knowing whether he can lawfully leave
or not. His own instinctive understanding of whether he is restrained or
whether the police have shown authority is not likely to be the standard
by which his decision will be judged. The only rational choice, then,
must be for him to assume that he cannot leave without being potentially
In the nonlegal realm, words ... have intentions and meanings that are distinct in
comparison to words ... in the legal realm ... [W]ords are more unfocused and
unstable; they are indeterminate. Compounding this problem is the uncertainty
regarding the consequences resulting from the meaning we give to legal language.
The innate tension manifested in the practice of law through its adversarial structure
even further compounds the problem of indeterminacy....
Legal language is full of words that are devoid of a predetermined meaning,
although as professionals we religiously maintain the fictions that words have
predetermined meanings.
The Sound of No Students Clapping: What Zen Can Offer Legal Education, 29 U.S.F. L.
REV. 313, 324 (1995).
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guilty of the crime of obstructing justice.286 He might even be hurt in
a physical altercation with police. Therefore, the right to walk away is
meaningless.28
It is precisely these types of encounters that characterize initial
contact between police and citizens in criminal trespass programs.
Officers see young men they do not recognize and, based upon little but
their gut feelings, the officers stop or pursue. Frequently, the police file
an obstruction of justice charge along with the trespass charge.288
The consolidated trespass cases from the Washington Supreme Court
raise the question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion in high-crime
neighborhoods.8 9 In each case, the arrested boys were simply standing
in a group with other young, black men and they ran when the police
approached. The majority held that the officers "had reasonable
suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of the appellants ... [and that]
appellants' flight from the police constituted obstruction of a police
officer."29  The Court reasoned that:
[B]ased on the officers' familiarity with the residents, the
posted warnings prohibiting trespassing and loitering, and
the flight of the appellants, the officers had reasonable
suspicion to believe that a criminal trespass was being
286. To further complicate matters, when a police officer chases a suspect with less
than articulable suspicion of wrongdoing, and the suspect discards contraband before the
officer physically seizes him, the contraband can be used against him. In other words, if
the suspect does not respond to an officer's show of authority, there is neither a seizure
nor a Fourth Amendment violation. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
287. Some scholars might argue that this procedure simply relies upon the good faith
of the police; if an individual officer chooses to act in bad faith, he or she can be sued in
a civil court. See, e.g., Zagel, supra note 182 (arguing that civil suits are the proper
remedy to abuses by police rather than changes in Fourth Amendment law).
288. The Supreme Court of Washington held that police had reasonable suspicion to
conduct a Terry stop for criminal trespass and that companion convictions for obstructing
justice should be affirmed. State v. Little, 806 P.2d 749, 753 (Wash. 1991). The New
Mexico Court of Appeals, in State v. Jones, 835 P.2d 863 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992), reached
an opposite result when it held that police had to have individualized suspicion that
someone was engaged in criminal activity to stop and frisk that person. Id. at 867. That
decision invalidated a stop of a known gang member who was walking in a high crime
area. Id. at 865. See also Monique M. Salazar, Note, Terry Stops and Gang Members in
New Mexico: State v. Jones, N.M. L. REV. 463 (1994).
289. For an excellent discussion of the role of poverty and race in identifying
reasonable suspicion, see David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black
and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659 (1994).
290. Little, 806 P.2d at 753.
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committed and properly attempted to conduct an investi-
gatory stop. Appellants' refusal to stop when requested
by the officers hindered, delayed and/or obstructed the
officers in the discharge of their official duties.29'
In a concurring opinion, one justice stated the police did not violate
Terry because the boys were not stopped merely for loitering, not
stopped merely for being in a high crime area, not stopped only because
they were not recognized, and not stopped singly because of flight.292
However, Justice Utter dissented, noting that the officer testified that he
not only had no suspicion of one suspect until he ran, but that that
suspect was not even a part of the larger group that broke up.293
Justice Utter pointed out that, astoundingly, the prosecutor argued that
"Terry standards do not apply to minimal police intrusions in high crime
areas."'294 Justice Utter wrote that the officer testified that all he knew
about the suspect he chased was that "he was a black male in the
area." 295 Justice Utter writes:
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the only
factors the officer could have considered when he decided
to seize Little were: (1) Little is a black male, and (2)
Little ran. Surely race cannot be a factor in justifying a
stop. That leaves the majority only with flight as possible
justification for the stop.296
The Justice concluded by targeting the heart of the right to walk away
fiction stating, "a person's refusal to stop cannot be the basis for criminal
liability unless the officer has a legal basis for stopping that person."297
What makes the criminal trespass encounters even more complicated
is the fact that officers can create a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity by giving a trespass notice on a previous date. This creates a
circular process: an officer cannot stop a person with the intention of
detaining him unless he has a reasonable articulable suspicion that that
suspect committed a crime. Therefore, giving an individual a trespass
291. Id. at 754.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 756.
294. Id. at 755.
295. Little, 806 P.2d at 757.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 758.
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notice on a previous date renders that person suspicious because he might
be engaging in the criminal activity of trespass. When virtually all of the
people trespassed off are of a similar race, age and gender, then all other
people of that race, age and gender may appear more suspicious of
criminal trespass. Thus, attributes which clearly would not have been
grounds for a Terry stop before the trespass program was established
have now become attributes for a Terry stop.
In the context of litigation, attorneys can educate courts, police
officers and others about many of the issues discussed in this section.
While most Fourth Amendment analysis focuses on the particular nature
of the suspicion that existed in a particular police-citizen encounter,
attorneys can use information about discriminatory actions to explain
certain behavior. For example, attorneys can put on evidence to show
why, in certain neighborhoods, it is perfectly rational behavior for black
men to avoid police contact.298 Attorneys can point out the history of
laws that have given police the power to stop, question, detain, and arrest
black men based upon little if any necessity, and how the trespass
program continues in that vein. Attorneys can suggest that courts keep
police powers separate from landlord management responsibilities.
Although police would have sufficient power to stop and detain persons
they suspect were engaging in criminal behavior, only landlords would
be able to issue trespass citations to those persons who were known to
be disruptive. Therefore, the police could not use the trespass ticket as
298. Citizens, and male African-American citizens in particular, widely report that
police routinely stop and question them with no legitimate basis for suspicion and, upon
finding nothing incriminating, allow such citizens to go on their way. These stops are
sometimes accompanied by verbal or physical abuse. When such harassment occurs to
celebrities or other persons with substantial financial resources, civil suits sometimes
follow. See Finkelman, supra note 5, at 1410-33. For example, the police pushed
National Baseball Hall of Fame member Joe Morgan to the floor of the L.A. airport,
handcuffed and dragged him away with his mouth covered because a black drug courier
indicated that his companion "looked like me" and the officer looked for a black man who
was nervous. Id. at 1429-30. The Long Beach police physically harassed Don Jackson,
a black L.A. police officer, based on manufactured suspicion. Maelin, supra note 219, at
1295 n.176. The description of what happened to Kenneth Hudson in his encounter with
the Dayton Police is strikingly similar. See supra notes 118-31 and accompanying text.
In a recent example, police grabbed, interrogated, and frisked Earl Graves, Jr. in
Chappaqua, New York in May, 1995. The police seized Mr. Graves, a clean-shaven black
man over six feet tall, wearing a suit and carrying a briefcase, when he exited a commuter
train, even though they were looking for a small, mustachioed black man. The police
department gave him a letter of apology. Lisa Genasci, Success Is No Shield From
Racism, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1995, at D9.
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a means to banish undesirable people. Finally, attorneys can demonstrate
how difficult it is to understand the complexities of the laws concerning
street encounters, and suggest to courts that police and community
members be required to discuss appropriate behavior by all of the parties.
Attorneys will have to be forceful, however, in raising these types of
issues in a litigation context. Judges may consider much of this
information irrelevant and not the central focus of a process designed to
narrowly consider elements and case theories.
Fourth Amendment challenges will not resolve underlying problems
experienced by residents, visitors, or police. Residents rarely have
standing to raise Fourth Amendment challenges-although some residents
are stopped and detained by police under the policy, resident detention
appears to be rare. The traditional Fourth Amendment challenge pits
visitors against police. If the visitor "wins" the case, he may succeed in
voiding the trespass procedure but the court would be authorized to do
little else. The visitor also has an interest in his own safety, and in the
safety of his friends and family who reside in the housing. A "success"
under a Fourth Amendment attack would protect the visitor's liberty
interests but offer little protection of his safety interests. Additionally,
while the policy might be struck down, there is no guarantee that the
state would not rewrite a policy that would comply with the letter of the
law but not address many of the underlying issues. These issues, such
as racially charged encounters and unclear expectations, would likely
remain. A lawful visitor unlawfully detained could thus litigate for many
years and spend many dollars only to obtain an incomplete remedy. If,
on the other hand, the police "win" the case, they will still be left
enforcing an unpopular policy in hostile territory. Litigation will only
polarize the community of residents and lawful visitors, who will be
forced to "choose sides." Police, who must depend upon community
support to make community-based policing work, will find themselves
isolated and unsupported by those members of the community who resent
the intrusions caused by the policy.
Neither of the extreme positions likely to be chosen by advocates
in litigation serve the interests of the parties. Residents and lawful
visitors are not interested in denying law enforcement the right to all
interaction with citizens on housing property. Some reasonable
interactions are not only allowable, but desirable to protect their safety.
Likewise, police have no interest in unrestricted access to residents and
lawful visitors at their whim. Such access would foster precisely the
kind of atmosphere that would render the police officer's job difficult
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and dangerous. Some reasonable restrictions would allow police greater
credibility and lead to greater success. Fourth Amendment litigation is
designed to assign blame to one side or the other, either striking down
or upholding particular police action. It is not designed to help the
parties reach a workable solution that would benefit the entire group.
The dialogue process has a much greater chance of success. A
group who engaged in dialogue might, for example, decide that all
interests could be met by a procedure that gave police officers authority
to check everyone who came onto subsidized housing property. Police
would not rely upon unfettered discretion in determining whom to stop
because they would stop everyone. Procedures could be developed that
would allow police to determine whether the person had a legitimate
reason to be present. For example, police might contact the resident who
was to be visited. Once it was determined that a legitimate reason
existed, the person would be allowed to proceed. If no legitimate reason
were determined, the person would be turned away, but not banned
indefinitely. Such a procedure or other procedures could be developed
to meet the needs of all of the affected parties.
B. Right of Association Claims
People who have challenged criminal trespass programs often allege
violations of their right of association.2  As a matter of state law,
people generally have a right to invite guests onto their property.300 It
is clear that a criminal trespass program carries the threat of turning
away guests of residents, including family members and close friends.
It is less clear whether any constitutional right is implicated by such a
result.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,30' the Supreme Court outlined
two types of associational freedoms protected by the Constitution:
freedom of "expressive association" and freedom of "intimate associa-
299. See, e.g., Brown v. Dayton Metro. Hous. Auth., No. C-3-93-037 (S.D. Ohio filed
Jan. 26, 1993); Miller v. St. Michaels Hous. Auth., No. Y-91-2412 (D. Md. filed Aug. 26,
1991).
300. See generally 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 504 (1995). A criminal
trespass statute, however, makes it a crime for a person to enter onto another's property
"without privilege." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.21(A) (Baldwin 1994). See supra
note 2 1.
301. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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tion."3 °2  Expressive association, which is derived from the First
Amendment, involves the right of people "to associate for the purpose of
engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech,
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of
religion."3 °3  By contrast, intimate association derives from the
Fourteenth Amendment concepts of Due Process and the broader
conception of liberty and privacy found in the Ninth Amendment and
the Bill of Rights.3°4
In Roberts, the Court defined the right of association as a "funda-
mental element of personal liberty.""3 5 The Court found that the Bill
of Rights "must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of
highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from
unjustified interference by the State." 306 This high level of scrutiny
affords constitutional protection to those relationships "that attend the
creation and sustenance of a family."307 These relationships include
marriage,30 8 procreation and abortion,30 9 the raising and education of
302. Id. at 617-18.
303. Id. at 618. The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. For a
discussion of the right of expressive association, see Shannon L. Spangler, Note, Freedom
ofAssociation-Explanation ofthe Underlying Concepts-Republican Party of Connecticut
v. Tashjian, 34 KAN. L. REv. 841 (1986). Examples of cases defining these rights are
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-85 (1972) (holding a state college may not refuse to
recognize a national student group with a reputation for violence as a legitimate campus
organization); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-45 (1963) (holding that a state cannot
prohibit an organization from soliciting legal business for political litigation); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960) (holding teachers need not reveal a list of
organizations to which they belong); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
461-63 (1958) (holding that a state cannot compel NAACP to reveal names and addresses
of members); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 363-66 (1937) (holding that a state
cannot prohibit communist meetings).
304. The Fourteenth Amendment reads, in relevant part: "[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNST.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Ninth Amendment reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CoNST. amend. IX.
305. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 619.
308. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (invalidating a statute making it
illegal to marry without court permission if behind in child support because the right to
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children,"' and family composition.3" What these relationships have
in common, according to Justice Brennan, are
deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few
other individuals with whom one shares not only a special
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also
distinctively personal aspects of one's life. . . . [T]hey
are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness,
a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and
maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in
critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter,
only relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely
to reflect the considerations that have led to an under-
standing of freedom of association as an intrinsic element
of personal liberty.32
The Court left open the possibility that other types of relationships
not specified in Roberts might have constitutional protection from state
interference. 33  For example, the Court held that a large business
organization, such as the United States Jaycees, is clearly not protected
by the right of intimate association.3"4 However, "[b]etween these
marry is fundamental).
309. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that liberty interests of women
include right to choose abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue influence
from the state); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking law
prohibiting use of contraceptives because it affects "relationships lying within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees"); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking sterilization law because marriage and procreation are
"one of the basic civil rights of man").
310. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (limiting to parental control
of children, if child protection is involved; "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder"); Pierce v. Society of
the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding a state cannot force parents to send
children to public school because it "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control").
311. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) ("Ours is by no
means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear
family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a
household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally
deserving of constitutional recoguition.").
312. Roberts v. United States, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
313. Id. at 620-22.
314. Id. at 620.
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poles [large business enterprise versus selection of one's spouse] ... lies
a broad range of human relationships that may make greater or lesser
claims to constitutional protection from particular incursions by the
State." '315 A court would have to assess "where that relationship's
objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate
to the most attenuated of personal attachments." '316
The Court has failed to find such relationships in two cases after
Roberts: Bowers v. Hardwiel"t 7 and FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dal-
las.318 In Bowers, the Court considered whether a statute making
sodomy illegal violated the Constitution. In a five to four decision, the
majority stated "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation
on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated." 319  Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Stevens, wrote an impassioned dissent; they found the
relationships implicated by Georgia's sodomy statute to fall squarely
within the right to intimate association.32
In City of Dallas, the Court found that patrons of a motel, which
limited rental of rooms to ten hours, did not have the type of relationship
protected by the right of intimate association.32' Justice O'Connor
wrote for the majority:
We do not believe that limiting motel room rentals to 10
hours will have any discernible effect on the sorts of
traditional personal bonds to which we referred in
Roberts. Any "personal bonds" that are formed from the
use of a motel room for fewer than 10 hours are not those
that have "played a critical role in the culture and
traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting
shared ideals and beliefs."322
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
318. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
319. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
320. Id. at 204. First, the decision regarding sexual activity was thought to fall
squarely within those decisions that only individuals can make. Id. at 205. Second, the
dissent found that regulating activity that takes place in one's bedroom violates a "spatial
aspect" of the right to privacy. Id. at 204.
321. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. at 237.
322. Id. at 237 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19).
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If a relationship does fall within the definition of intimate associa-
tion, the state action must "directly and substantially" interfere with that
association to be actionable.3" In Lyng, the Court held that a state
food stamp law that classified family-member households differently
from non-family-member households did not directly affect whether
families could choose to live together, and was therefore not subject to
strict scrutiny.324
Analysis of criminal trespass policies to determine whether
associational rights are implicated requires an examination of two
elements. First, a plaintiff must show that one or more intimate
relationships are involved.3  Second, there must be a showing that
some state action directly and substantially interfered with that relation-
ship.326 If these elements are proven, the challenger has established a
prima facie case that the state action has violated the right of intimate
association. Because this right is considered fundamental, the burden
shifts to the state to show a compelling state interest in the action that
outweighs the liberty interests of the challengers.327 Policies are rarely
upheld when faced with this test.
1. Does the Type of Relationship Meet the Criteria of the Intimate
Association Test?
Several different categories of relationships have been affected by
various criminal trespass policies. Men who have been trespassed off
public housing property have claimed interference with their relationships
with their children, girlfriends, immediate family members, and extended
family members. Similarly, residents have claimed interference with
their relationships with their boyfriends, fathers of their children, adult
children, and extended family members. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that immediate family, extended family (including
grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, and cousins), and all parent-
child relationships are protected by the right to intimate association.328
323. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
324. Id. at 642-43. Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion, criticized the majority's
view that a "loss of benefits" would not "influence family living decisions." Id. at 644.
325. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984).
326. Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638.
327. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
328. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 509 (1977).
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It is not as clear, however, whether boyfriend or girlfriend
relationships are included, particularly in light of Bowers and City of
Dallas. While relationships between adult men and women would
appear to meet the requirements set forth in Roberts,329 the Court has
been reluctant to provide protection to non-blood relatives who are not
married.330 Moreover, it is unclear whether the Court's stance against
sexual relationships between adult men and women might be expressed
as it was in the Court's analyses in Bowers and City of Dallas. If the
Court were to look to deeply-rooted American values for guidance, no
clear moral stance emerges. Attorneys arguing for a broader definition
of intimate association might point out that federal entitlements are now
available to persons who live together without being married,33' and
federally subsidized housing residents are protected against rules that
govern who can visit them.32 Birth control and abortion services are
accessible to women regardless of whether they are married, and a law
that tried to limit those services to married women would certainly be
found unconstitutional.333
People who oppose criminal trespass policies have complained of
interference in relationships that, for the most part, are clearly protected
by the Constitution. Unmarried adults who are prevented from visiting
boyfriends or girlfriends, however, may or may not be considered to be
involved in protected relationships.
2. Do Criminal Trespass Policies Directly and Substantially Interfere
with Protected Relationships?
Assuming that the relationships between residents and their
prospective guests who are trespassed off housing sites do enjoy
constitutional protection, it is not clear whether criminal trespass policies
would be found to directly and substantially interfere with those
protected relationships.
329. The requiring factors include "size, purpose, policies, selectivity, longeniality, and
other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
330. See FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986). One circuit court has found that the right of intimate association applies
to adult women who wish to marry one another in a religious ceremony. Shahar v.
Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995).
331. See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
333. Cf. Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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If an officer stops a person because he is suspected of criminal
activity other than trespass, and if criminal activity is substantiated, then
the person could be arrested or cited for the underlying criminal act. In
and of itself, this does not constitute any interference with rights of
association.334 However, if the person is subsequently given a notice
of trespass without the police first ascertaining whether the person has
a legitimate basis for being on the property, a direct and substantial
interference with associational rights may occur if that person was
visiting a resident on the property.335 In Dayton, for example, persons
found to be engaging in criminal behavior, no matter how slight, are
always given a trespass notice regardless of why they were on the
property. Thus, men playing dice, drinking beer, or arguing with their
girlfriends were all given notices of trespass even though the underlying
offense did not merit a citation and the men were visiting family at the
time. A trespass notice, however, interferes with a man's associational
rights because he can no longer visit the public housing property for
some period of time.
Another scenario might involve an officer stopping someone who
appears to be engaging in criminal behavior and finds no such behavior
substantiated. If the officer then proceeds to issue a notice of trespass,
this state action would directly and substantially interfere with that
individual's right of association. For example, the police might stop a
man in his car and give him a notice of trespass even though he could
not identify any criminal behavior. Rather than instinctively issuing this
notice, the officer may ask the person why he is present and verify the
explanation given. If the explanation is confirmed (e.g., a person states
he is visiting his grandmother and she verifies his explanation) and the
officer allows the person to proceed without interference, it is doubtful
that the state directly and substantially interfered with his right of
association. Similarly, if the proffered explanation is refuted by a
resident (e.g., the alleged grandmother states that the person is not her
grandson), then it is doubtful that issuing a notice of trespass would
directly and substantially interfere with a protected relationship.336
334. Even if there is a direct and substantial interference, there is a compelling state
interest in stopping and detaining someone who is engaging in criminal behavior.
335. While the detention related to the criminal behavior would be lawful, the future
restraint on association is directly implicated here.
336. However, this circumstance could directly and substantially interfere with a
person's right of association if the person is prevented from visiting someone else in the
Washington University Open Scholarship
210 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 49:133
Finally, an officer may stop an individual if he has reason to believe
that person has previously been given a notice of trespass and suspects
that person is trespassing. Hence, one's mere presence on the property
is apparently seen by officers as sufficient grounds to arrest that person
for criminal trespass. 3 7 If the officer makes no attempt to solicit or
verify an explanation for why the person is on the property-as is more
common with these types of stops-then the officer has directly and
substantially interfered with the person's right of association.
3. If Direct and Substantial Interference of a Right of Intimate
Association is Established, Can the State Justify this Interference?
If a plaintiff establishes a direct and substantial interference with a
fundamental right, the burden shifts to the state to prove that public
policy justifies the state action.338 This justification must be more than
a mere showing of a rational relationship, the state, following the "strict
scrutiny" test, must show a "compelling state interest. '339 Although the
states rarely meet this burden, they might overcome it by proving
criminal trespass policies fight crime, and specifically drug related
crimes. However, it is hard to determine whether the persons receiving
trespass notices are actually committing drug related crimes. First, while
states can often show a decrease in overall crime following the enactment
of criminal trespass policies, crime statistics are not typically categorized
by drug status. Second, it is impossible to credit decreased crime
statistics solely with trespass policies because most public housing
communities added community based officers and increased officer
numbers when these policies were instituted. By the same token, it is
also impossible to prove that the decrease in crime is unrelated to the
policy. Thus, it is difficult to see how banishing a person who is
drinking beer with his cousin or playing dice on the sidewalk will assist
in the termination of drug trafficking.
future. Given the person's lack of forthrightness in the initial stop, however, it is doubtful
that such a circumstance would lead to constitutional protection unless there were no
legitimate appeal process. If there were no appeal process, even these stops would be
suspect because a person could never have his name removed from the trespass list.
337. State criminal trespass statutes would still require an independent verification of
whether the person has permission to be on the property.
338. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
339. When the state is found to restrict a fundamental right, the state must show that
it has a compelling state interest in the policy or it will be found unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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Even if an individual commits a drug-related crime, the state might
have difficulty showing how such a policy adds to the compelling state
interest of punishing these individuals. Punishment and control are
sought by means other than prohibiting such persons from visiting their
relatives. For example, if a middle class, white male is arrested for
selling powder cocaine and is released on bond, he is usually free to
return to his home and visit his friends and neighbors, pending trial.
After serving his sentence, if convicted, he is again free to associate with
his loved ones. However, a poor, black male arrested for selling crack
cocaine in a public housing project can-in addition to all the other
penalties, which may themselves be higher for him than for his white
counterpart-be prohibited from visiting family and friends for several
years due to the trespass policy.
Because associational rights involve fundamental rights balanced
against government interests, lawyers can raise the issues discussed in
section III of this Article in their arguments for a less intrusive policy.
Fundamental rights cases, however, are rarely decided on an ultimate
balancing test. Rather, it is more likely a court would uphold or strike
a trespass program based upon the intimate relationship test or the direct
and substantial interference test."' But, the presence of a balancing
test does allow attorneys to bring in evidence of the interests of the
various parties affected by the policy.
Clearly, the greatest benefit of the trespass program to police
officers is an officer's ability to arrest someone who has not committed
any other crime. Consider this: if an officer sees and substantiates
criminal behavior, he can arrest that person at that time. The trespass
program, however, allows the officer to arrest the person even if he has
not committed a crime. The opportunities for abuse are widespread. In
some communities, selectively arresting persons for minor misdemeanors
such as jaywalking as a method of controlling drug crimes are overt, and
some courts have suggested these methods violate the Fourth
Amendment. " ' Criminal trespass programs can serve a similar
function for law enforcement in a less overt manner. It is hard to see
what legitimate purpose is served by the trespass program that cannot be
340. See supra note 22. But see Brown v. DMHA, No. C-3-93-037 (S.D. Ohio filed
Jan. 26, 1993) (ruling against plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction that the
trespass policy did not directly and substantially interfere with rights of association).
341. Meiring, supra note 5, at 529.
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achieved through regular law enforcement methods. Attorneys represent-
ing parties who challenge these programs can make these arguments.
It is not likely that the Supreme Court would find a violation of
associational rights in a trespass program. The Court has not found any
state program to violate the right of intimate association or right of
privacy in any circumstances, other than procreation, since the 1978
Zablocki v. Redhail decision involving the right to marry.342 While the
circuit courts still recognize the right as a legitimate constitutional
protection, they too have not been eager to find violations of that
right.343  As a federal district court judge stated in a public housing
case in 1995:
[T]he extent to which a housing authority official may
infringe on a tenant's right to association to promote a
safe living environment is not well or clearly established.
The courts have not articulated objective criteria that will
enable public housing officials to reasonably determine,
in any given set of circumstances, when the housing
authority's legitimate interest in promoting the health and
safety of its tenants justifies interfering with a tenant's
right of association and when it does not. In the absence
of such criteria, a reasonable housing official could not
determine whether issuing a notice of termination to a
tenant based upon a perceived health and safety threat
resulting from the tenant's association with protest roup
members violated that tenant's right of association.
342. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding no right of intimate association existed between members
of the United States Jaycees).
343. See, e.g., Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Georgia, 43 F.3d 609, 614 (11th Cir.
1995) (finding city's antinepotism policy did not violate employee's right of intimate
association); McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1569 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (transferring police
chiefs secretary to a less desirable job after she married another police officer did not
violate her right to intimate association); Coronel v. Hawaii, No. 91-16842, 1993 WL
147318, at *2 (9th Cir. May 6, 1993) (holding prison rule that inmate can only make long
distance calls to his family during evening hours did not violate his right of intimate
association); Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1549 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding police
officer did not unduly interfere with right of intimate association by falsely informing wife
that her husband confessed to child abuse). But see Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11 th
Cir. 1995).
344. Herring v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 90-C-3797, 1995 WL 77305, at *9 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 21, 1995). Although, this case involved alleged violations of the right of expres-
sive association, the court granted the individual defendants qualified immunity because
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In spite of strong logical arguments to the contrary, it is extremely
unlikely that a court would conclude that a criminal trespass program
would violate the right of intimate association. While the Supreme Court
rhetoric is built upon the presence of this fundamental, "intensely
personal" right, Supreme Court practice shows that the right is on shaky
ground. Public housing authorities, police officers, residents, and visitors
are left confused and uncertain regarding what the boundaries are when
police interfere with personal relationships.
Litigation using association theories cannot resolve the underlying
problems either. Residents and lawful visitors would not want to prevent
police officers from ever questioning a friend or family member. The
safety interests of residents and lawful visitors would suggest that
residents and lawful visitors would want police officers to be able to
determine whether people have a legitimate purpose for being on the
premises. Residents would not want police, however, to become
involved in the details of their personal lives; nor would they want police
to use information learned as a result of the fight against violent crime
against them in their efforts to maintain food, clothing, and shelter.
Police, too, have an interest in setting boundaries. Police do not
want to work in a setting where residents and lawful visitors are afraid
to speak frankly with them. Litigation using association theories, like
those employing the Fourth Amendment, result in one side winning or
losing. If the police win, they may be forced to work in a hostile, angry
and hurt community of people who feel their personal lives are invaded.
If the residents or lawful visitors win, they may lose police protection.
Police may be genuinely confused about how they can and cannot act
under the law. Litigation based upon constitutional violations is not
structured to allow courts to craft appropriate remedies or to allow courts
to instruct parties to engage in dialogue. Rather, a constitutional
violation is found to exist or not to exist, thus voiding or maintaining the
policy.
V. CONCLUSION
Most challenges to subsidized housing anti-crime measures have
been based upon constitutional analyses. Constitutional analysis has
traditionally failed to address issues that must be resolved in fashioning
anti-crime measures that will work. Methodologies based on dialogue
the law was so unclear. Id.
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between affected parties are more likely to result in practices that are
workable to housing authority staff, law enforcement, residents, and
members of the community. A policy which comes out of this process
will take into account the needs of a variety of affected parties,
protecting minority as well as majority interests in most instances.
Public interest attorneys must take affirmative steps to increase the
opportunities for meaningful dialogue to take place. Attorneys should
consider whether the time and money spent on litigation will ultimately
result in policies and practices that will benefit their clients. If litigation
is needed, lawyers should consult different perspectives and present the
information to the court. Attorneys can craft settlement plans that will
pay community leaders to organize meaningful dialogue concerning the
underlying issues that prevent anti-crime measures from working
effectively. They can also encourage their clients to begin discussions
about these underlying issues. If resident and community needs are to
shape the policies and practices of the future, public interest attorneys
must find ways to create and sustain dialogue between those parties who
would be defined as opponents in traditional litigation.
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